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INTRODUCTION
The May 7 inauguration of the Eastern Partnership of the European Union and its
Eastern neighbours in Prague, during the Czech presidency, is an event of symbolic
significance. The collapse of communism in Eastern and Central Europe ushered in
hope for peace, security and the sovereign right of every nation to choose its own path
of development. Today, through the Eastern Partnership, the enlarged European Union,
which integrates nations from both sides of the former “Iron Curtain,” seeks to offer
similar opportunities to its Eastern neighbours.
The Eastern Partnership is a new regional cooperation proposal addressed to
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. It is related to the
European Neighbourhood Policy pursued since 2004 and is based on the same
principles and methods of action. Its principal objective is to bring the Eastern
neighbours closer to the EU. This is essentially a plan for the development of relations
between the Union and the countries of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus, a plan that
offers the latter a possibility of gradually joining in EU policies and programmes and of
integration with the common market. EU’s cooperation with its Eastern neighbours is to
lead to the transfer of good EU practices in the fields of trade, economy and politics, and
its pace will depend on the changes taking place in those countries and the partners’
expectations.
The architects of the Eastern Partnership are Poland and Sweden, which in May
2008 proposed a deepening of relations with the Eastern neighbours embraced by the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). However, the shape of the project was the
outcome of actions by many EU members. The necessity of intensification of relations
with the Eastern neighbours was raised by the Visegrád Group (V4) countries: the Czech
Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, which were presenting specific proposals in
this respect. A similar position was taken by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In the first half
of 2006, the Austrian presidency proposed the building of a joint energy policy, of
which dialogue with Ukraine and Belarus, as the transit countries for fuels shipment,
would be one element. When it held the presidency in the first half of 2007, Germany
came up with the “ENP Plus” project. It proposed presenting an attractive and broad
proposal for deeper relations to EU neighbours that would make it possible for the
Community to enter into sectoral agreements with states embraced by the ENP. Then
the adoption by the European Council, in December 2007, of a Polish-Lithuanian
proposal for the development of the Southern and the Eastern ENP dimension not only
on a bilateral, but also on a multilateral plane, became a sign of the evolution of the EU’s
approach to the neighbourhood policy.
The Eastern Partnership is seen by many member states as a continuation of their
prior endeavours to strengthen the ENP in its Eastern dimension, as well as a new
opening in the EU’s relations with the countries to which it is addressed. The initiative
also met with strong support due to the changing determinants in and around the EU.
Five years after the EU enlargement, its member states are no doubt more aware of the
challenges and threats existing in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. Nowadays all
members are more aware than in the past that tension, political and economic instability
and “frozen conflicts” in the region can directly affect the EU. Not without reason, work
on the Eastern Partnership project gathered momentum after the Russian-Georgian war,
and cooperation in the energy sector is an important component of the Eastern
Partnership. At the same time, the experience of several years of implementing the ENP
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showed that in order to improve the effectiveness of that policy it is necessary to adapt
its instruments to the specific characteristics of the countries which it concerns, take into
account more broadly the aspirations of “European neighbours of the EU” from Eastern
Europe and respond to the expectations of “Europe’s neighbours” from North Africa and
the Middle East. Support for the Eastern Partnership was also helped by the political
change in France, which was long the main opponent of broader relations with the
Eastern ENP countries. When Nicolas Sarkozy, the new president, came up with the
proposal of a Union for the Mediterranean, it could be expected that, in exchange for
consent to the enlivening of the Southern dimension of ENP, he would back the Eastern
Partnership, all the more so as at the same time France was seeking closer relations with
new EU member states, notably Poland. Consequently, in March 2008, after the
European Council meeting which passed the decision to go ahead with the Union for
the Mediterranean, Poland’s Foreign Minister Rados³aw Sikorski promised to present a
new initiative for the Eastern neighbours embraced by ENP. The acceptance of Eastern
Partnership was also facilitated by the fact that right from the start the “old” member
states joined in the project. Thanks to Sweden’s involvement, the development of an
independent EU Eastern policy ceased to be perceived as a sphere of interest of
primarily the “new” EU member states. A major role was also played by the European
Commission, which in December 2008 issued an ambitious communication serving as
a basis for further discussions on the subject in the EU.
In its bilateral dimension the Eastern Partnership assumes the development of
new legal bases of the relations between the EU and its Eastern neighbours in the form of
association agreements and the establishment of deep and comprehensive free trade
areas. The implementation of the Eastern Partnership signifies, among other things, the
embarking on efforts for the benefit of a full liberalisation of the visa requirements in
relations with the individual partner countries and the development of cooperation in
the field of energy security. The deepening of relations with the EU depends on the
partners’ progress in implementing such values as democracy, rule of law, upholding
human rights and the implementation of the principles of market economy, sustainable
development and good governance. At the same time, the EU undertakes to support
reform efforts in the neighbour states, e.g. by improving their administrative
capabilities. The Eastern Partnership is not an enlargement strategy, although it is not
ruled out that the states which it concerns could become EU members at some point in
time. The model of relations with the EU defined in the Eastern Partnership appears to
be sufficiently flexible and attractive to be acceptable both to those countries that are
just interested in close cooperation with the EU and those that aspire to be included in
European integration. In addition, Belarus’ participation could open up space for
dialogue with lower and middle structures of the Belarusian establishment, contributing
to changes in that country.
Compared to the European Neighbourhood Policy, it is the multilateral
dimension of the Eastern Partnership that is a new element. This is connected with
regular meetings between EU representatives and the Eastern neighbours at the level of
heads of state or government, ministers of foreign affairs, senior officials and experts.
The multilateral dimension of the Eastern Partnership is to contribute to the supporting
of political and economic transformations in the countries of Eastern Europe and South
Caucasus, becoming a forum for an exchange of information and partners’ experience
in such areas as democracy, good governance and stability, economic integration and
convergence with regard to EU policies, energy security and people-to-people contacts.
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Many EU members and some partners expect that multilateral cooperation will also
serve as a confidence building mechanism in the region.
Financing is important, too. In the years 2010–2013, the EU is planning to
allocate €600 million to the Eastern Partnership. Of this total, €350 million are new
funds, while €250 million was set aside from ENP regional cooperation for the needs of
the Eastern Partnership. While this is not an amount that could solve the region’s
problems, the acknowledgement alone that EU policies towards the Eastern neighbours
require additional funding is a step toward bigger funding in a not-too-distant future. An
opportunity to discuss this matter will first be provided by a budget review, followed by
negotiations concerning the new financial perspective for the years 2014–2020. It
should be noted that these are not the only funds that the EU is now allocating to aid to
the Eastern neighbours embraced by ENP. In the years 2007–2013 they will receive
more than €1 billion from the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, in
addition to loans from the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development.
* * *
What needs to be done so Eastern Partnership is not reduced to symbols and
slogans that are not followed by concrete actions? How can the political impulse, which
the consent of all the member states to the implementation of this initiative certainly
constitutes, be taken advantage of in order to genuinely bring the Eastern neighbours
closer to the EU? Many factors will undoubtedly impact the implementation of the
Eastern Partnership. It seems, however, that its future will be determined in the largest
measure by the commitment and the political will of the states to which this project is
addressed and of EU member states. Therefore, this report is to serve a comprehensive
analysis of their attitude to Eastern Partnership. On this basis one can also draw
conclusions about the role that the EU member states may play in pursuing this initiative
and formulate proposals concerning its implementation. The report concerns only
marginally the remaining actors, such as the European Commission and third countries
that will also exert an influence on the implementation of this EU initiative.
A review of the EU member states’ policy toward the Eastern Partnership
warrants the opinion that they are aware of the need for the EU’s greater involvement in
the Eastern Europe and South Caucasus region. They support the idea of establishing
a deepened free trade zone and association agreements between the EU and the Eastern
Partnership addressees. For the most part, they are also interested in cooperation in the
field of energy, which was distinguished in the project as one of the main areas of
cooperation between the EU and its Eastern neighbours.
Several divergences came to light in the course of discussions on the Eastern
Partnership. It was the proposal for the allocation of additional funds for the Eastern
Partnership that aroused particular controversy. It was viewed reluctantly by most of the
net payers, who feared the costs of this new initiative. Its opponents also included the
Southern EU members, which demanded a proportional increase in funds for the
Southern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Also discussed was the
proper relationship between the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy pursued
since 2007, in which most of the Eastern EU neighbours are involved. In many countries
one could hear critical opinions about the idea of liberalising the visa requirements,
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which was largely due to fears of an uncontrolled influx of immigrants to those member
states in which they already account for a significant proportion of the total population.
The Eastern Partnership initiative also triggered a discussion on the relations
between the EU and Russia in the area of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus. Most
member states have acknowledged that its implementation should not lead to a rivalry
between the EU and Russia, let alone the isolation of that country in the region. Some
states were opposed to perceiving EU initiatives addressed to the Eastern
neighbourhood from the angle of Russia’s interests. In their opinion, Eastern Partnership
should serve a rapprochement between the Partnership countries and the EU,
regardless of the position held on that matter by Russia, which views Eastern Europe and
South Caucasus as a zone of its influence. All the member states have emphasised the
need of parallel development of the Eastern dimension of the ENP and of EU-Russia
cooperation. According to EU members, the contradictions, if any, between the goals of
Eastern Partnership and Russia’s fears, could be alleviated with the involvement of the
latter in individual projects pursued within the framework of the Partnership.
There certainly are some EU member states that could be tentatively described as
the “Friends of Eastern Partnership” group on account of their particularly strong interest
in cooperation with the addressees of Eastern Partnership. The architects of this
initiative, i.e. Poland and Sweden, occupy a special place in this group. The Central
European and Baltic EU member states closely cooperated in devising the shape of the
Eastern Partnership. Also consultations with Germany played a very important role.
German support was central to the building of consensus in the EU. These efforts and
support from the European Commission mean that the Partnership meets the
requirement of preserving the internal cohesion of the ENP and duly takes into account
the experience of that policy toward the partners in the East. It also means that there is a
chance for closer cooperation of the Eastern neighbours and a “new quality” in their
relations with the EU.
The “Friends of Eastern Partnership” group will be responsible in the future for
maintaining the EU’s political support for that initiative, for securing funds for financing
it and for persuading the Eastern neighbours to implement the indispensable political
and economic reforms. Significantly, both the Central European and the Baltic members
support the creation of chances of integration with the EU for those Eastern neighbours
who have articulated such aspirations. For them, the Eastern Partnership is a pragmatic
reply to the “enlargement fatigue,” its biggest advantage being the fact that it makes it
possible to act for the benefit of bringing the neighbour nations closer to the EU and can
at the same time be acceptable even to those EU members which are not prepared to
discuss new enlargement commitments at this time.
It is necessary to safeguard the involvement of Black Sea cooperation advocates
in the implementation of Eastern Partnership. These include, for example, Germany,
which came up with the Black Sea Synergy plan, Romania and Bulgaria, as well as
Greece, a Mediterranean country. The last three countries are interested in cooperation
with the countries to which the Eastern Partnership is addressed, owing to their
geographical location and to ties of a cultural, political, economic and social nature.
They have been looking at the Eastern Europe and South Caucasus region from the
angle of the Black Sea basin, which is why, during the debate on Eastern Partnership,
they aired their fears about the sidelining of the Black Sea Synergy and pointed to the
need for a complementary nature of both initiatives. They suggested, for example, that
Eastern Partnership could concentrate on bilateral cooperation and adaptation of the
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neighbour countries to EU standards, while the Black Sea Synergy would focus on
multilateral projects and on building confidence and security in the region. In practice,
the attainment of the advocated complementarity of these initiatives may turn out to be
much more difficult to achieve than theoretical analyses would imply. In order to avoid
ambiguities concerning competence and the overlapping of the two initiatives, it would
be necessary to develop firm decisions of a political and technical nature in this regard.
One solution could be the establishment of a mechanism for coordination of Eastern
Partnership and other EU initiatives in the region, another would be the adoption of a
more definitive “chart of complementarity” of regional initiatives in order to avoid
controversy in the future, all the more so as the emergence of the Eastern Partnership
caused a revival of the strivings of some member states to strengthen the existing (the
Black Sea Synergy) or advance new concepts of regional cooperation engaging Eastern
neighbours.
France, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece and, since the 2004 enlargement, also
Cyprus and Malta, have often been referred to as the Mediterranean EU members. They
do not constitute a formal group within the EU, but such threats and challenges as
migrations, terrorism or energy security and economic interests connected with the
Mediterranean basin are responsible for the fact that they generally act together in
favour of greater EU involvement in the region. Even so, it would be an
oversimplification to suggest that they take a reluctant view of Eastern Partnership. The
countries that have traditionally looked south are showing growing interest in the
Eastern neighbours, and especially in economic cooperation or cooperation in the fields
of energy, internal security and border management. Besides, Greece and Cyprus have
been active in the Black Sea Synergy, while the growing number of immigrants from
Eastern neighbourhood countries in Spain and Portugal exerts some influence on the
development of political and economic relations of those more distant EU members
with the Eastern Europe region. A common denominator of the countries interested in
relations with the Southern and the Eastern neighbours is no doubt the interest in the
development of the ENP. Despite the differences regarding the type of political and
financial involvement of the EU in the East and the South, the promotion of political,
legal, institutional and good management standards and democratic norms in the EU
neighbourhood is in their common interest.
In order to make full use of the potential of the member states, the most interested
members should be able to engage more deeply in particular areas of cooperation or in
the implementation of specific Eastern Partnership flagship projects. That idea already
appeared in the Polish-Swedish proposal, while in its December communication the
European Commission pointed out that member states “with an experience of transition
have a particular contribution to make” with regard to the work of thematic platforms.
Therefore a lot will depend on the commitment of Germany and the Central and
Northern Europe countries, on their cooperation and the ability to build broader
coalitions of states willing to participate in specific sectoral projects. It can be assumed,
that, for example, it would be possible to recruit the cooperation of the Southern EU
members in the field of border management, that the member states dependent on the
supplies of fuels from the East would engage in cooperation in the energy sector, or that
the Scandinavian countries or the Netherlands would be interested in questions of
democracy or the promotion of human rights. Also the UK can be expected to get
involved in the implementation of the Eastern Partnership. The countries embraced by
the initiative may not be major economic or political partners for that country, but there
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is considerable British interest in the region, which reflects the UK’s general support for
actions serving the broadening of the area of stability, security and free market through a
further enlargement of the EU.
In connection with the implementation of the Eastern Partnership, there should
be some coordination of the development programmes addressed by the member states
to the Eastern neighbourhood so that funds are expended in the most efficient manner.
The experience of countries having some significant achievements in granting
development and transformation aid could come in handy in this context.
EU members have an important role to play in implementing the Eastern
Partnership, although its success depends on the Eastern neighbours’ commitment to
the project. The level of upholding of the rules of democracy, civil rights and liberties
and of the rule of law varies among the countries to which EaP is addressed. In practice,
it is chiefly possible to speak about democracy, understood as the upholding of election
procedures, the rights of the opposition and freedom of the media in the case of
Ukraine. The situation of Georgia and even more so that of Armenia and Moldova
demonstrates numerous shortfalls in this regard. Belarus and, to a smaller extent,
Azerbaijan, are ruled in an authoritarian way. The six countries’ expectations toward
the EU also differ. Some want to join the EU (Ukraine and Georgia, and, if formal
declarations are taken into account, Moldova and Azerbaijan as well), while others
have not voiced such demands, even though there are pro-Europe forces of various
strength in those countries (Armenia, Belarus).
Despite the big differences in the position of the neighbouring countries
regarding the Eastern Partnership, the EU initiative has on the whole been received well.
Aside from open criticism by the Moldovan president and comments by some
diplomats to the effect that the European Council’s March decision was less ambitious
than the European Commission proposal, the plan gave rise to hopes for a new opening
in relations with the EU. All the partners positively assessed the proposed scope of
development of relations with the EU, voicing particularly large interest in the
liberalisation of visa requirements, the lifting of trade barriers, cooperation in the field of
energy and obtaining financial support.
The Eastern Partnership is an initiative of strategic significance for the stability
and security of both the countries of the Eastern dimension of ENP and of the EU as a
whole. In particular, the South Caucasus countries expect a growth of EU involvement
in the solving of the region’s conflicts. It should, however, be noted that although some
EU members proposed that the Eastern Partnership should also serve the boosting of EU
activity in this area, the view that ultimately prevailed was that the initiative should be
focused first of all on the EU exerting its influence as a “soft force.” According to some
member states, the omission of the “hard” security agenda, or “desecuritisation,” will
effectively contribute to the growth of the level of confidence and an improvement of
international security in the region.
The countries interested in integration with the EU welcomed the fact that from
among all the countries embraced by the European Neighbourhood Policy “European
neighbours of the EU” were distinguished, i.e. six countries located in Europe as per the
political definitions, some of which have openly articulated the will to accede to the
Union. It is worth remembering that when the European Neighbourhood Policy was
proclaimed, these states were highly critical that the EU was treating them on the same
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footing as the culturally distant countries of North Africa and the Middle East, which
were denied a possibility of EU membership.
The Eastern Partnership also meets halfway public expectations in that it draws
attention to the role of people-to-people contacts in bringing the Eastern neighbours
closer to the EU. That area of cooperation, which includes, for example, student
exchange, joint cultural and research projects, actions promoting the building of an
information society and independent mass media, should become one of the
foundations of Eastern Partnership that is developed regardless of the will of the political
elites. Its aim, after all, it to strengthen the civic society, which is the foundation of an
efficient democratic state. The Eastern Partnership Civic Society Forum, a plan launched
under the auspices of the Czech presidency in Prague, is a pioneering initiative in this
respect. Meetings of this kind should be of a periodic nature so that representatives of
the civic society of the states invited to the Eastern Partnership could actively contribute
to the implementation of that initiative through the exchange of experience and through
presenting their observations, proposals and expectations to the EU.
When assessing the prospects for Eastern Partnership implementation, it is
important to bear in mind that this is an auxiliary instrument, and not a package through
which the EU will be solving all the problems of Eastern neighbourhood. While it meets
the expectations of the EU’s European neighbours and is consulted with them, the
Partnership is an EU decision. However, the filling of the framework defined by
Partnership with concrete action will depend in a much bigger measure on the states to
which it is addressed, their political will, readiness and progress in strengthening their
ties with the EU. Therefore it is worth looking at the multilateral dimension of
cooperation, whose functioning gives rise to justified fears due to the conflicts
prevailing in the region. Multilateral cooperation is a value in itself and the EU is
interested in promoting it in its vicinity. However, its significance should not be
overestimated and the success of the whole concept of Eastern Partnership should not
be contingent on its development. The principal limiting factor is the need for
consensus, which is difficult when dealing with countries that are so different or that
actually are at loggerheads with one another. Closer cooperation between those
beneficiaries of Eastern Partnership that are most interested in specific projects could be
a step in the right direction. Nonetheless, multilateral cooperation should only
complement bilateral relations between the EU and the Eastern neighbourhood
countries. The pace and scope of political and economic changes that will bring those
countries closer to the EU and could actually lead to their accession in the future, will
depend first and foremost on bilateral relations and individual involvement of the
neighbour states.
* * *
This report is divided into two parts. The first presents the involvement of
individual member states in defining the Eastern Partnership, in particular their attitude
toward the initiative and the actions of EU members that promote it. Chapter II deals
with the reactions of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to
the proposal for Eastern Partnership and their expectations regarding that initiative. An
annex to the report contains references to the major documents related to the creation of
Eastern Partnership.
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The report was prepared based on declarations of ministers of foreign affairs and
statements by representatives of the bodies taking part in defining foreign policy in
individual countries. The authors also talked to officials from some foreign ministries
and diplomatic missions. The country-by-country reports bear the imprint of their
authors as the idea of putting the individual country reports in the rigid framework of a
uniform research questionnaire was dropped. This did not prove to be very productive
in view of significant differences in problems of the Eastern Partnership in individual
countries, the diversity of sources and oftentimes also a lack of clear views of the
authorities on individual matters that the debate concerns. As, following a unanimous
decision of the European Council, the EaP became a community project, the authors
could forego a literal description of the position of individual EU countries regarding the
matters on which a general consensus exists, attempting to focus instead on the specific
features of national involvement in devising the Eastern Partnership and the way it has
been perceived.
The Report was prepared by the staff of the Research Office of the Polish Institute
of International Affairs: £ukasz Adamski (£A), Ryszarda Formuszewicz (RF), Mateusz
Gniazdowski (MG), Marcin Koczor (MK), Rados³aw Ko³atek (RK), Aleksandra
Kreczmañska (AK), Rafa³ Morawiec (RM), Andrzej Szeptycki (ASze), Adam Szymañski
(ASzy), Robert Œmigielski (RŒ), Rafa³ Tarnogórski (RT), Beata Wojna (BW), Ernest
Wyciszkiewicz (EW), Bart³omiej Znojek (BZ). It is an abridged version of a bigger study
on the subject of the Eastern Partnership that is being prepared by the Polish Institute of
International Affairs. In addition to the attitude of EU member states and the neighbours’
approach to Eastern Partnership, that study will review relations between individual
member states and the countries of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus as well as the
involvement of the member states in the development of the European Neighbourhood
Policy so far.
Beata Wojna
The Polish Institute of International Affairs12
Ea
st
er
n
Pa
rt
ne
rs
hi
p
Chapter I
European Union Members
on Eastern Partnership

Austria
Austria has well established relations with countries of Eastern Europe, where its
most important partners are Russia and Ukraine. Those relations are less developed in
the case of the South Caucasus, although, given energy related issues, this region plays
an increasingly important role in Austrian policy. The Austrian government, which
supported the implementation of the ENP, promotes a vision of neighbourhood in
keeping with which the EU should conclude agreements on partnerships with
neighbours, thus forming a “circle of friends.” The ENP is treated as an alternative to EU
membership, allowing only closer relations between the EU and its Eastern neighbours,
but not their accession.
Austria reacted positively to the Eastern Partnership initiative,1 which—according
to this state—would allow a more active development of the ENP in a period of
economic crisis. It also pointed out that the EU should take greater responsibility for the
stability of its Eastern neighbours in these especially difficult times. In connection to the
Polish-Swedish proposal, the former Austrian minister of foreign affairs, Ursula Plassnik,
pointed to the significance of individual partnerships that could grow within the
framework of the EaP, partnerships that could allow the adjustment of bilateral relations
to the Eastern neighbours’ ability and willingness to carry out the necessary reforms.2
Austria’s favourable attitude towards the Partnership is not unrelated to that
country’s desire to protect its economic interests threatened by the crisis. Austrian banks
are very active in Eastern European countries (they have granted in Ukraine about €10
billion in loans). These banks could sustain considerable losses. This also explains the
efforts made by Werner Faymann’s government to bring about the EU’s adoption of an
assistance package for the region.3
From the Austrian point of view, the emergence of the EaP is a stimulus for the
development of the Danube Process, which Austria, as one of its initiators (the other
being Romania) treats as a high priority.4 In February 2009, the ministers of foreign
affairs of Austria and Romania presented to the remaining EU members a proposal
concerning the enhancement of economic, social and cultural cooperation of Austria,
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary,
with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine. They proposed
that during the June 2009 EU summit the European Commission be asked to draw up
a comprehensive strategy in this respect. Its realisation could begin during the period of
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1 In addition to the sources mentioned further on, this chapter is based on the author’s
correspondence with the Austrian Ministry of European and International Affairs during the period 23
February to 11 March 2009 and on conversations with officials of this ministry on 24 March 2009 in
Vienna.
2 See Plassnik: Bedeutender Energieschub für die Beziehungen mit Russland, Bundesministerium
für europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten, Presseaussendungen, 26.052008, www.bmeai.gv.at.
3 See “BankenhilfeOst: Österreich kämpft umHoffnungsmarkt,”Die Presse of 10 February 2009.
4 The process of the Danube Basin cooperation was officially established in 2002 on the basis of
the initiative of Austria, Romania, the European Commission and the Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe. See Regierungsprogramm für die XXIV. Gesetzgebungsperiode, p. 226, www.austria.gv.at;
Danube Co-operation Process, www.stabilitypact.org.
the Hungarian presidency of the EU, i.e. during the first half of 2011.5 Austria is only
beginning to formulate the principles of this new “Danube Basin States concept,” hence
only very general and vague statements are heard about its relation to the EaP. The
Austrian Foreign Minister Michael Spindelegger announced during the EU Council
meeting in Brussels on 23 February 2009 that this new concept would play the role of
a “bridge.”6 This declaration supposedly has the same sense as the oft-repeated
emphasis on the significance of the Danube basin process for tying the EU to the
countries of the Black Sea region. Austria’s positive attitude to this region determines its
attitude toward the EaP. Austria stresses the necessity of complementarity of the Eastern
Partnership and other EU regional projects involving Black Sea countries or the EU
Eastern neighbours.7 Complementarity should also be the guiding principle behind the
Danube basin concept that could reinforce the EaP in the case of countries participating
in both initiatives. This reveals yet another possible meaning of the notion of “connector,”
i.e. that of linking various regional initiatives through the Austro-Romanian undertaking.
Minister Spindelegger supported the idea of including Belarus in the EaP,
although he made its participation dependent on the development of that country’s
relations with the EU and its readiness to conduct economic and political reforms and to
adopt European values.8 Austria is not opposed to including third countries, such as
Russia or Turkey, in individual multi-lateral projects. This would counter the perception
of the EaP as an anti-Russian initiative, whereas the inclusion of Turkey would constitute
yet another argument in support of the Austrian concept of EU-Turkish relations,
providing for a special type of “Turkish-European Community” as close to full EU
membership as possible.9 Austria is clearly opposed to treating the EaP as a tool of the
EU’s enlargement policy.
Austria supports solutions concerning the EaP that are not related to an expansion
of the EU’s institutional dimension. The creation of a mechanism for the coordination of
the EaP with other EU initiatives in the region is of key importance for Austria. With
regard to the protection of Austrian interests threatened by the economic crisis, Austria
supports the earmarking of additional funds for the EaP. This was reflected in its support
for the European Commission’s proposal to earmark €350 million for the EaP from the
unused funds from the 2007 budget.10
Austria values, above all, the bilateral dimension of the EaP. Multilateral
initiatives stand little chance to be implemented given the diversity of all participants.
Austria will presumably continue to support little projects in areas such as energy or
integrated border management (IBM). Given the present economic crisis, measures in
support of small and medium size businesses could also prove important for Austria.
(ASzy)
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5 See “Neue Strategie für den Donauraum,” Wiener Zeitung of 25 February 2009,
www.wienerzeitung.at.
6 See Spindelegger: Mehr Geld für Ost-Partnerschaft, 23.02.2009, www.nachrichten.at.
7 See Spindelegger: “Potential der Zukunftsregion Schwarzmeer voll nützen,” Bundes-
ministerium für europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten, Presseaussendungen, 26.02.2009,
www.bmeai.gv.at.
8 See Spindelegger: Mehr Geld für Ost-Partnerschaft, op.cit.
9 See Regierungsprogramm für die XXIV. Gesetzgebungsperiode, op.cit., p. 227.
10 See Spindelegger: Mehr Geld für Ost-Partnerschaft, op.cit.
Belgium
Belgium supported the process of establishing the ENP from the very outset and
was a proponent of including countries of the South Caucasus in this form of
cooperation. The Belgian authorities declared that all countries included in this policy
should be viewed as EU partners in the same manner. They think that the EU should act
to reinforce the Eastern dimension of the ENP in parallel with the efforts made with
regard to the Southern dimension. They make a clear distinction between the EU
enlargement process and the neighbourhood policy, which should not be a tool serving
accession. Although Belgium declares an “even distance” from both the Southern and
Eastern dimensions of the ENP, in practice it pays more attention to the Southern
dimension.
Belgium has traditionally been against any efforts made with a view to set out
new vectors of European policy or to shift existing ones, even if these concern the EU’s
external relations.11 Thus Belgian diplomacy has adopted a wait-and-see attitude with
regard to the Polish-Swedish initiative. It only viewed it more favourably, though not
uncritically, after the European Commission’s December 2008 proposal, recognising it
as a basis for further discussions.
Belgium supports the European Commission’s conditions defining the procedure
for negotiating association agreements with potential partner countries and the creation
of a deeper and comprehensive free trade area. Moreover, it notes that some initiatives,
such as comprehensive programmes for the improvement of administrative abilities,
should be extended to the EU’s Southern neighbours. Belgium also draws attention to
the problem of the migration of people from Eastern neighbourhood countries to the
EU. The introduction of border crossing facilitations is treated by Belgium as a tool to
incline neighbouring countries to cooperate in the creation of a safe environment in
such countries (improvement of public safety, combating organised crime), one that
goes beyond the questions having to do only with safe travel documents.12
On the subject of institutionalising cooperation with EaP countries, the Belgians
have reluctantly agreed to a working structure whose outline was included in the
European Commission’s proposal. Belgium sees no benefit in the establishment of the
position of a special EaP coordinator. In its view, the reinforcement of internal
Commission structures, as was stated in the communiqué, is sufficient. Belgium also
voiced reservations in connection with the financing of the EaP, supporting a debate on
this subject both at the level of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership
Instrument steering committee and at the political level. It viewed unfavourably the
earmarking of additional funds for the EaP and stressed that the budget should be
sufficient to meet the obligations undertaken earlier. (RK)
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11 The information contained in this part comes from the Permanent Representation of the
Kingdom of Belgium in Brussels.
12 For example, a passport issued by the appropriate authorities is not a sufficient guarantee of the
assurance/provision of safe surroundings, given that it is relatively easy to obtain a genuine document
using a false identity.
Bulgaria
Relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus, especially
with Russia, play an important role in Bulgaria’s foreign policy, with the enhancement
of cooperation between states of the Black Sea region also among the country’s vital
objectives. Bulgarians point out that the best instrument for the implementation of EU
and Bulgarian interests in this area is the Black Sea Synergy, assessing all initiatives
directed to EU neighbours through the prism of this cooperation forum.
Initially, the Bulgarians distanced themselves from the Eastern Partnership
proposal. The primary reason for this was fear of a negative impact of this initiative on
the Black Sea Synergy, which Bulgaria supports, the more so as the European
Commission report of June 2008 indicated that its implementation would encounter
problems.13 Bulgarian authorities took a critical stance with regard to concepts of
development of the Eastern dimension of the ENP that include only some of the Black
Sea basin countries, without Russia and Turkey. They also feared that the
implementation of undertakings mentioned in the EaP project could reduce resources
earmarked for the Synergy and thus reduce its already limited effectiveness.
Most probably Bulgaria’s attitude towards the Eastern Partnership had to do with
the negative stance initially adopted by Poland—one of the EaP’s initiators—with regard
to the Synergy. The Bulgarians feared that Poland, pressing for the EaP, would want to
marginalise the Black Sea Synergy within the framework of the ENP. Although the
Polish government’s criticism of this initiative was later toned down, during the June
2008 meeting of the Council of Europe, Bulgaria was one of the EU members that
voiced the greatest number of reservations with regard to the EaP. The Polish delegation
ultimately succeeded in convincing the Bulgarians that both initiatives should be
complementary and, therefore, they will not compete with one another.14 Nonetheless,
in February 2009, Bulgaria, along with Romania and Greece, submitted a non-paper
proposing to reinforce the Synergy following the model of the EaP. This proposal did not
meet with any significant interest on the part of the remaining EU members.
Taking Bulgaria’s position into account, the conclusions of the European Council
on 19–20 June 2008 stated that cooperation in the EaP “should … be complementary to
the already existing and planned multilateral cooperation under and related to the ENP,
in particular the Black Sea Synergy and the Northern Dimension.”15 Similar
formulations are to be found in the declaration from the meeting of ministers and
secretaries of state for European affairs of countries of the Visegrád Group and Bulgaria
and Romania that took place on 26 September 2008 in Warsaw.16 The inclusion in the
declaration of the European Council on the Eastern Partnership of assurances
concerning the complementarity of both initiatives and the strengthening of the Black
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13 The Commission Communiqué for the European Council and European Parliament, Report on
the First Year of Implementation of the Black Sea Synergy, COM(2008) 391, www.eu-lex.europa.eu.
14 See Informacja rz¹du na temat posiedzenia Rady Europejskiej w dniach 19 i 20 czerwca
2008 roku, stenographic record (299) from the 26th Meeting of the Commission for European Union
Affairs on 25 June 2008, www.senat.gov.pl.
15 The Council of the European Union, Brussels, 20 June 2008 (11018/08), European Council in
Brussels 19–20 June 2008, Conclusions of the Presidency, www.ukie.gov.pl.
16 Declaration of the Ministers and State Secretaries Responsible for European Affairs of Bulgaria,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia andHungary, adopted inWarsaw on 26 September 2008, www.ukie.gov.pl.
Sea Synergy was one of the conditions for the support that Bulgaria and other member
states engaged in the promotion of the Synergy, such as Germany, Romania and
Greece, gave to the EaP initiative during the European Council on 19 and 20 March
2009. (RM)
Cyprus
Cyprus is mostly involved in furthering Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and
perceives the EU’s Eastern neighbours above all through the prism of the resolution to
the Cyprus question. It is interested in the Black Sea Synergy given the participation of
Turkey, among other reasons. Russia plays an especially large role in the policy pursued
by Cyprus—its attitude in the Cyprus question favours Cyprus and as a permanent
member of the UN Security Council it has a real influence on its resolution. Russia is
also an important economic partner of Cyprus as a supplier of energy resources. The
development of relations with other countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus
is affected by the presence on the island of an Armenian minority, as well as immigrants
from Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.
Cyprus greeted the Eastern Partnership positively and sees it as a complement
and reinforcement of the ENP as well as a project that prevents the isolation of non-EU
countries and the formation of new cleavages in Europe.17 From the moment the
initiative was announced, Cyprus stressed the necessity of including it within the
framework of the ENP so as to maintain the cohesion of this policy and to prevent the
Eastern region’s domination of EU actions intended for its neighbours. In the opinion of
Cypriot diplomats, the EaP and other similar EU regional initiatives, such as the Black
Sea Synergy, should be complementary.
The Eastern Partnership is only beginning to be debated and, therefore, Cyprus is
only addressing its general principles. In connection with the institutional dimension
and specific projects of the EaP initiative, Cyprus stresses the importance of pragmatism,
efficiency and adapting to the needs of different partners. It further draws attention to the
fact that, in the matter of EaP financing, it is necessary to take into account the balanced
approach that is functioning in the ENP. Cyprus agreed with the proposal of the
European Commission to earmark an additional €350 million for the EaP from the
unused funds from the 2007 budget, on the condition that proportionate additional
funding is provided for the Southern dimension. It was also pointed out that countries
subject to the EaP have high expectations, which the EU is not able to fulfil.
According to Cypriot diplomats, the Eastern Partnership should not be connected
with the policy of EU enlargement, although in practice it could help partner countries
in reaching that goal in the future. Cyprus does not single out any partner country with
which it could develop closer relations within the EaP framework. While it is not against
the participation of Belarus, it is conscious of the fact that this is a difficult undertaking,
especially in connection with the EaP’s bilateral dimension, in which Belarus would
have much catching up to do.
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17 The part is based on a telephone conversation that took place on 3 March 2009 with the
representative of the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The possibility of the participation of third countries in EaP projects gives rise to
various reactions. According to Cypriots, the EaP cannot become an undertaking
directed against the Russian neighbour. It is, therefore, better to include Russia in EU
initiatives within the EaP framework than to leave it out. The Cyprus question is a factor
in Cyprus’ conservative, if not unfavourable, attitude towards Turkey’s participation in
EaP projects. (ASzy)
Czech Republic
The Czech Republic is a consistent advocate of an “open-door policy” and of
differentiating between EU’s “European neighbours” in the East and “Europe’s
neighbours” in the South. When preparing for EU Council presidency scheduled for the
first half of 2009, it defined Eastern Europe as one of three “priority areas” (next to
trans-Atlantic relations and the West Balkans). It promised action in favour of a “more
distinctive” profile of the Eastern dimension of the ENP and the “allocation of adequate
funds,” emphasising the significance of democratisation and transformation in the
Eastern partnership countries.18
The Czechs joined in the formation and implementation of the Eastern
Partnership, regarding this initiative as the crowning of their own attempts to strengthen
the Eastern dimension of ENP. Already when chairing the Visegrád Group (2007–2008),
the Czech Republic was pointing to the need of building “such an ENP that will
equitably divide its funds and possibilities between the Eastern and the Southern
dimension.”19 However, this was not a question of copying institutional solutions from
EU’s Southern neighbourhood, but of exerting joint influence on the remaining EU
countries in order to lessen their resistance to the deepening of cooperation with EU’s
Eastern neighbours. The Czech Republic was using the “V4+” formula for developing
broader cooperation for the benefit of the Eastern dimension of ENP. However, it
proved impossible to work out a joint project using the V4+Sweden format, although
joint declarations were made to the effect that a “further enhancing and deepening the
cooperation with the Eastern ENP partners will bring additional benefit to the EU as
a whole.”20 In April 2008, the Czechs presented their own proposals for the
strengthening of the Eastern dimension of ENP at a meeting of the working group on
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST). They were largely convergent with the
Polish-Swedish concept, albeit with more emphasis on multilateral cooperation and
a project-based approach. Neither have the Czechs reported the need to build separate
institutions within ENP or have distinguished Ukraine in any way.21 When in May
Poland and Sweden presented their proposal for the EaP, the Czechs articulated clear
support for it, and reaffirmed it during the June V4 summit in Prague.22 Then they
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18 Prioritní oblasti pøedsednictví Èeské republiky v Radì EU v prvním pololetí roku 2009,
www.vlada.cz.
19 Summit pøedsedù vlád zemí Visegrádské skupiny v Praze 16. èervna 2008, www.vlada.cz.
20 Joint Statement of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Visegrad Group Countries, Sweden
and Ukraine, 23 April 2008, Czech Republic, www.visegradgroup.eu.
21 Ý. Òóëüìåö, “×åøñêèé ìåìîðàíäóì ïî âîñòî÷íîìó ñîñåäñòâó: êðàòêèé àíàëèç è êîììåíòà-
ðèè,” Åâðîïà, 2008, no. 2 (27), pp. 63–74.
22 Press Release: Official Summit of the Prime Ministers of Visegrad Group Countries, Prague,
June 15–16, 2008, www.visegradgroup.eu.
participated in defining a more detailed EaP proposal, which was submitted to the
European Commission in October 2008.
The Czech Republic recognised EaP as an important instrument of cooperation
and consolidation of European neighbours’ ties with the EU, acknowledging at the same
time that a rapid accession of those countries was out of the question.23 The Czechs
perceive EaP as a mechanism devised to promote the raising of standards in countries
aspiring for EU membership and the consolidation of their ties to the EU, and, by that
token, support autonomy and independence, which became particularly valid after the
war in Georgia24. Before the start of its presidency, the Czech Republic was cautioning
the EU against making excessive concession to Russia in foreign and security policies
and criticised Russia for designating a “privileged interest” zone.25 Once it assumed the
presidency, it toned down its criticism of Russia’s policy, recognising EU unanimity as
“central” to EU’s relations with Russia.26 It admitted that Russia was an important partner
for EU, one whose “policy toward the countries of Eastern Europe contributed in
a significant measure to the EU’s successes also in this area” and announced that it
intended to talk to Russia also about the Eastern Partnership.27 However, the Czech’s
resisted French pressures aimed at treating Russia in a special way in the EaP
preparations.28 At the same time, they were pointing out that the EU had
“above-standard” relations with Russia and was talking to it more often than with EaP
countries, so the charges of “ignoring” that country in the discussions over EaP were
groundless.29
The presidency promised that EaP would serve the attaining of internal
equilibrium in ENP. The launch of EaP was connected with the axiology of the Czech
presidency, articulated by the motto “Europe without barriers.” It was the ambition of
the Czech government to offer EU’s Eastern neighbours the maximum degree of
opening of the economies and movement of people acceptable to all EU member states.
The launch of EaP, along with progress in building EU’s energy solidarity, was to be
a yardstick of the presidency’s success.30 The Czechs noticed a close interdependence
between these two challenges, emphasising their competence in the field of Eastern
policy and their understanding of energy security. The devising of an EU strategy toward
Eastern neighbourhood was to be not just a “moral duty” toward EU’s European
neighbours, but also a pragmatic step making it possible to “diversify foreign trade and
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23 Èeské pøedsednictví v poloèase, www.mzv.cz.
24 A. Vondra, “Je tu riziko hrubé záplaty (M. Švehla),” Respekt of 6 April 2009, p. 50.
25 Schwarzenberg: Rusko musí dodrovat pravidla, ÈTK, 27.12.2008.
26 Prioritní oblasti pøedsednictví Èeské republiky v Radì EU v prvním pololetí roku 2009,
www.vlada.cz.
27 M. Topolánek, Aktuální výzvy èeského pøedsednictví – “2G,” finanèní krize, Východní
partnerství, 29.01.2009, www.vlada.cz.
28 Czech EU Presidency Not Against Russia, Turkey in Partnership, ÈTK, 23.02.2009.
29 Zápis ze 49. schùze výboru pro evropské záleitosti konané dne 17. bøezna 2009,
www.psp.cz.
30 Czech Government Committee Approves EU Presidency Priorities, ÈTK, 22.12.2008.
shipments of energy sources.”31 Meanwhile, energy should become an important topic
of both the dialogue with Russia and with the Eastern Partnership countries.32
In connection with the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis at the outset of 2009, the
Czech authorities were explaining the need to launch the EaP by the crisis of confidence
in relations with the EU’s Eastern partners and the urgent necessity of raising energy
security. The presidency was pointing to Ukraine’s significant role in the EaP and to
EU’s interest in preserving that country’s pro-Europe line. However, it emphasised that
its credibility as a transit country had been badly dented.33 EaP is to be an instrument
that will encourage Ukraine to tidy up its intransparent economic structures, especially
in the energy field, and to strengthen market mechanisms, thus contributing to greater
security of supplies coming from the East. The development of EaP aimed at bringing the
Eastern neighbourhood countries closer to EU standards should help avoid similar
crises in the future.34 The strengthening of the external dimension of EU’s energy policy
was to be effected with the help of the Eastern Partnership, cooperation with Russia and
with the countries engaged in the Southern Corridor project.35
The presidency promised to open a “constructive EU-Belarus dialogue” and
further support for building a civic society in that country. It made the further
development of EU’s relations with Belarus contingent on internal liberalisation in that
country. It also warned that the recognition of independence of separatist Georgian
provinces could threaten Belarus’s participation in EaP. There was also important
pressure from Czech NGOs, which insisted that the participation of a Belarusian
delegate at the EaP summit in Prague be made contingent on the fulfilment of a number
of conditions by the Belarusian authorities, one of them being the amending of the
criminal code.36 The Czech authorities emphasised that they had addressed the
invitation to the EaP summit to “Belarus,” without naming the president, while
emphasising at the same time that the changes taking place in that country were
“insufficient and not of a structural nature.” The possibility of the arrival of a Belarusian
representative to Prague was criticised by President Klaus.
Representatives of the Czech authorities admit that EaP’s problems are not
limited to Belarus, but also include the condition of the political elites of other countries
to which this initiative is addressed.37 This is why there is evident emphasis in the Czech
actions on the development of the “civic dimension” of EaP. According to the Czech
leaders, the EaP should be an offer addressed not only to political elites but also to the
people of the partner states. In order to emphasise it, a conference “Eastern Partnership:
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31 Presentation of the Czech Presidency’s programme (debate), 14.01.2009,
www.europarl.europa.eu.
32 Work Programme of the Czech Presidency. Europe without Barriers. 1 January – 30 June 2009,
www.eu2009.cz
33 Jednania o asociaènej dohode EÚ s Kyjevom sa potiahnu asi celý rok, ÈTK, 4.02.2009; Cf.
“Bartuška: Kradnú ve¾a a rýchlo,” Sme of 4 April 2009.
34 A. Vondra, NATO, Russia, Oil and Gas: The Future of European Security—Munich Security
Conference, 7.02.2009, www.eu2009.cz.
35 European Policy Centre—Pøedsednictví EU 2009: první ohlédnutí—Za úèasti A. Vondry,
místopøedsedy vlády pro evropské záleitosti, 18.02.2009, www.eu2009.cz.
36 Cf. Èeské organizace vyzývají politiky, aby zváili pozvání Aleksandra Lukašenka do Prahy,
27.02.2009, www.civicbelarus.eu.
37 Zápis ze 49. schùze výboru pro evropské záleitosti konané dne 17. bøezna 2009, www.psp.cz.
Towards Civil Society Forum” attended by representatives of NGOs from EU member
states and EaP countries was organised as an official side-event of the presidency in the
run-up to the EaP summit in Prague.
The attainment of EU consensus on EaP became a prime objective of the Czech
presidency, while, due to its role as a moderator, it took a more reserved approach to
pushing those EaP elements that were seen as controversial by some. This self-restraint
on the part of the Czech Republic could clearly be seen with regard to the financing of
EaP, although, in the opinion of the Commission, the raising of the budget for EaP from
€350 million to €600 million would not receive the support of all members but for the
Czech presidency’s efforts.
While the presidency seeks to avoid emphasising Czech interests, objectively
speaking the Czech Republic is a country that is particularly interested in the
strengthening of the EU’s ties with the Eastern neighbourhood countries. The
implementation of the Eastern Partnership is tied to the possibility of enhancing the role
of the Czech Republic as a transit country. The Czechs are interested in an improvement
of Ukraine’s credibility as a country situated on the transit route of raw materials to the
EU. It is also in their strategic interest to extend the East-West trans-European corridor
from Bavaria to Kiev. An improvement of market mechanisms in the EaP countries is
seen as an opportunity for Czech entrepreneurs. However, Russia accounts for three
quarters of Czech exports to the East and its significance for the Czech economy will rise
in connection with new Czech investment in Russia’s energy, steel, mining and motor
industries.38 Taking into account the high value of these contracts, one should not
expect the EaP countries to become more important from the economic point of view
than Russia to the Czech Republic. The Russian investment in the Czech Republic,
especially in real estate, power engineering and the engineering industry is also
a significant consideration.
The summit opening the Eastern Partnership in Prague became one of the last
major undertakings of Mirek Topolánek’s cabinet before it was recalled. As the
opposition gained an influence over the government, it is worth noting that Social
Democrats are not quite as enthusiastic about the Eastern Partnership. With regard to
Eastern neighbourhood (including the Georgian-Russian conflict) and energy security,
they were pointing out that “strategic talks with Russia should continue in the first place”
and emphasised that “it’s impossible to do an Eastern policy without that country.”39
(MG)
Denmark
Denmark attaches great importance to measures aimed at the stabilisation and
democratisation of the countries of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus. An expression
of this commitment is, for example, the developmental aid directed to those countries
within the framework of the “Neighbourhood Program” adopted in 2004. The Danes
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schùze výboru pro evropské záleitosti konané dne 17. bøezna 2009, www.psp.cz.
played an important role (along with Great Britain) in the establishment of the ENP by
proposing, in 2002, the “New Neighbours” initiative, which was to be addressed to
such countries as Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus. The government in Copenhagen
holds the view that the “European prospect” of European EU neighbours should not be
rejected, but it stresses the necessity to take into account the Community’s absorption
capabilities. It is favourably disposed towards the idea of building a free trade zone as
part of the ENP, and favours the establishment of a Pan-European Economic Area.
Denmark supported the Eastern Partnership initiative and greeted the relevant
communication of the European Commission of December 2008 positively. The
Danish government did not formulate a detailed position in the matter of the EaP, but
expressed general support for the initiative’s individual elements. Denmark looks quite
favourably upon Belarus’ participation in the Partnership, as it thinks that this could be
an opportunity for a gradual liberalisation of the political system that exists in that
country.
Denmark’s attitude toward the EaP is in large measure a reflection of its
perception of the regions of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus through the prism of the
implementation of Danish developmental projects in these areas. These experiences
could turn out to be particularly valuable from the viewpoint of steps taken within the
framework of the EaP and, for this reason, they could be used at the planning stage for
particular initiatives. (MK)
Estonia
Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus are the most important areas for Estonian
foreign policy. Estonia maintains well developed relations with the states covered by
the European Neighbourhood Policy, and it regards this policy as a stage preparing ENP
countries for EU membership. The government noted that introducing visa facilitation
lies in Estonia’s interest; it is in favour of concluding free trade agreements and supports
close energy cooperation among ENP countries. Estonia’s privileged partner is Georgia,
the largest beneficiary of Estonian development aid for several years. Estonia expects the
ENP to be expanded in the future to deal with the settlement of regional problems.
The creation of the Eastern Partnership was found to be one of the most important
decisions taken in 2008 within the Common Foreign and Security Policy.40 Estonia
perceives the EaP as providing a political framework for the EU’s cooperation with
partner countries, and for the latter’s close integration with the block. Together with
Lithuania, Latvia and Visegrád countries, it has striven hard for an “ambitious” EaP,41
calling for its institutional strengthening through the appointment of a special
coordinator and the establishment of internal structures, such as ministerial meetings
and working groups.
Estonia welcomed the change in the EU’s policy towards Belarus, seen as an
attempt at a new opening up to the Minsk regime. The Estonian government expects that
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www.riigikogu.ee.
41 Common Position of Visegrad Countries, and Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and
Sweden, 24 November 2008, www.visegradgroup.eu.
these moves will also result in stronger bilateral relations between the two countries.
“We are interested in the opening up of Belarus to Europe,” said Foreign Minister Urmas
Paet, but “raising the level of human rights protection in Belarus remains a relevant
issue.”42 The readiness to tighten cooperation is reflected in the government’s decision
of 29 January 2009 to open an embassy in Minsk and in the launch by the Estonian
e-Governance Academy of e-state courses for Belarus public servants. (RK)
Finland
One of the principal aims of Finland’s European policy is the development of the
Northern Dimension, i.e. cooperation between the EU, Russia, Norway and Iceland.
Finish support for the ENP has been based on the reservation that this policy should be
conducted in parallel with the Northern Dimension and that under no account can it
have a competitive character with regard to relations with Russia. Finland is making
efforts so that relations with Russia will not negatively affect Finish policy in relation to
the EU’s other Eastern neighbours. Among other things, it looks favourably on the
prospect of EU membership for Ukraine.
Finland has declared its support for the Eastern Partnership initiative, recognising
that it had been well prepared. It expressed some incomprehension about Russia’s
negative reactions, seeing no reason to conduct consultations with Russia on this
subject.43 Finland treats the EaP primarily as a complementary instrument with regard to
existing forms of regional cooperation developed by the EU. In the opinion of the Finish
government, the EaP does not endanger the Northern Dimension, including relations
with Russia. Finland supports, as a matter of principle, the expansion of incentives for
countries included in the ENP, primarily further liberalisation of trade, and stresses the
necessity of developing the “human dimension” in relations with those countries. The
Finish minister of foreign affairs, Alexander Stubb, admitted that the Russian-Georgian
conflict had led to a shift of the EU’s interest eastward.44 He also emphasised that the EU
needed two Eastern policies—one directed at Russia and a second to the countries of the
ENP’s Eastern dimension, as the political stability and economic development of these
countries lies in Europe’s interest. In keeping with this approach, the EaP is becoming
a central element of this second Eastern policy. Finland is interested in the maintenance
of a balance in the development of both ENP dimensions and it treats the EaP as an
adequate response to the emergence of the Union for the Mediterranean.
Finland has a positive attitude towards proposals such as a deeper free trade area
or visa facilitations, while stressing that their implementation should be tied to the
progress made by each individual country included in the EaP.45 The Finnish
government showed a cautious approach to proposals of additional financing and
emphasised that such an increase should not take place at the cost of trans-border
cooperation, for which €1.11 billion from the European Neighbourhood and
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42 Estonia to Open Embassy in Belarus, 29.01.2009, www.vm.ee/eng/kat_138/10602.html.
43 “Finnish PM Welcomes Plan to Boost EU Ties with Eastern Region,” EU Business,
www.eubusiness.com.
44 “Alexander Stubb: The EU Needs Two Eastern Policies,” Articles and Columns, 18.12.2008,
http://formin.finland.fi.
45 On the basis of information from the Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU.
Partnership Instrument has been allocated for the years 2007–2013. Common
trans-border programs between Finland and Russia are also funded from this source.
Finland supports the participation of Belarus in the EaP, while noting that the
suspension of EU sanctions (the ban on EU entry for Belarusian officials) has already led
to the first positive changes in the attitude of that country’s authorities. (MK)
France
France attaches great importance to the EU’s cooperation with its Mediterranean
neighbours and participates actively in the development of the ENP’s Southern
dimension, an expression of which was President Nicolas Sarkozy’s initiative to
establish the Union for the Mediterranean. Countries that form the principal target of the
Eastern Partnership do not play a primary role in French foreign policy, and Eastern
Europe and South Caucasus are traditionally perceived through the prism of Russia as
the largest political and economic partner in the region, although the French authorities
are now aware that neither France nor the EU can ignore the EU’s Eastern neighbours,
especially Ukraine, if they wish to play an active role on the international stage. Given
the development of a European energy policy, France is also paying greater attention to
gas sector relations in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus.
President Sarkozy is showing a decidedly greater interest in the growth of EU
cooperation with its Eastern neighbours than did his predecessor. During his electoral
campaign, Sarkozy supported, among other things, making it possible for them to
access the common market and to participate in certain EU policies.46 France even
supported the EaP project prior to its adoption by the European Council in June 2008.47
France’s position, however, was due primarily to tactical concerns and only to a lesser
degree to any genuine interest in the realisation of the Polish-Swedish proposal. France
wanted to gain the support of Poland and other Central European countries for the
Union for the Mediterranean project. It also expected that the development of the
cooperation between the EU and its Eastern neighbours in 2008 would be seen as an
accomplishment of the French EU presidency. And finally, perhaps it wished to counter
the impression it had made on the countries of Central Europe and in Ukraine and
Georgia when it opposed the proposal to extend NATO’s Membership Action Plan
(MAP) to the latter two countries at the alliance’s Bucharest summit in April 2008.
The French authorities point to the EaP’s positive aspects, stressing the necessity
of a harmonious development of EU policy with regard to both its Eastern and Southern
neighbours.48 In their view, the EaP project, which was established after the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean, in some sense
legitimises the two initiatives, showing that there is a need to work out new instruments
of cooperation with regard to selected groups of neighbours and that just as Southern
European countries are interested in collaboration with other Mediterranean countries,
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46 “Dix enjeux de politique étrange`re,” Le Monde of 16 April 2007.
47 Conseil européen des 19 et 20 juin 2008 et présidence française de l’Union européenne.
Intervention du secrétaire d’Etat chargé des affaires européennes, m. Jean-Pierre Jouyet, au Sénat, Paris,
17 June 2008, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr.
48 Déclaration de M. Jean-Pierre Jouyet, secrétaire d’Etat aux affaires européennes, notamment
sur le vote négatif des Irlandais concernant le Traité de Lisbonne et sur les priorités de la présidence
française de l’Union européenne, au Sénat, 17 June 2008, http://discours.vie-publique.fr.
so are countries of Eastern Europe striving to intensify their relations with the EU’s
Eastern neighbours.
According to Sarkozy, the EaP is to help resolve the problems of Eastern Europe
and the South Caucasus (territorial conflicts, minorities, etc.) and to reinforce these
regions’ stability and security.49 In addition the EaP is to facilitate an adequate and
ambitious cooperation with the neighbouring countries, consisting in a specific golden
mean between their admission to EU and a lack of interest in them.50 France is opposed
to the thesis which holds that partnership brings Eastern European countries closer to EU
membership, although—as the French ambassador in Ukraine noted—neither the ENP
nor the EaP prohibit striving for membership in the Union.51 It is also against too
far-reaching integration with Eastern neighbours within the framework of the EaP.
According to unofficial information, in December 2008, France and a few other EU
members blocked the European Commission’s proposal to liberalise the visa regime for
citizens of countries included in the EaP. France was also against increasing funds
allocated for the EaP to €600 million. The French authorities’ argument was that an
increase of aid for the Eastern neighbours would signify a departure from the principle of
distribution of funds allocated for the ENP. They pointed out that, in any case, the
proposed funds were too small to support Eastern neighbours in any significant
manner.52
Despite these reservations, it seems that the EaP project is playing a growing role
in French policy directed at countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. In
August 2008, when France held the EU presidency, Sarkozy became actively involved
in the resolution of the Russian-Georgian conflict, although he was accused of
ineffectiveness and an excessively conciliatory stance towards Russia. The war in
Georgia increased the French government’s interest in EU policy with regard to Eastern
Europe and in the EaP project, which it recognised as an instrument of stabilisation in
the region. During the meeting with President Micheil Saakashvili in November 2008,
Sarkozy announced increased cooperation between the EU and Georgia within the
framework of the ENP and the EaP.
During the French presidency the Union undertook steps to tighten relations
between the EU and Ukraine. In September, it was decided that the new EU-Ukraine
understanding would have the form of an Association Agreement; in October,
negotiations began on the introduction of a visa-free travel regime. These steps were
greeted with mixed feelings in Ukraine, where there were fears that the EaP and other
initiatives begun in 2008 would de facto make it possible for France to block Ukraine’s
prospects of EU membership. It is worth noting that during the gas dispute between
Ukraine and Russia at the turn of 2008 and 2009, France pushed for the intensification
of EU efforts aimed to increase its energy security. At the same time, France considered
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République, M. Nicolas Sarkozy, du président d’Ukraine, M. Viktor Iouchtchenko, et du Président de la
Commission européenne, M. Jose Manuel Barroso—propos de M. Sarkozy, Paris, 9 September 2008,
www.diplomatie.gov.fr.
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2008.
52 “EU Ministers at Odds over Energy and Eastern Projects,” EU Observer of 24 February 2009,
http://euobserver.com.
the Russian-Ukrainian conflict to be a “trade dispute” and demanded, without favouring
either side, that both sides fulfil their international obligations in ensuring the supply
and transit of gas.53
In the second half of 2008, efforts were also made to normalise EU relations with
Belarus. French diplomats were expressing the hope that in 2009 a democratised
Belarus would become a full member of the EaP. These declarations were most
probably not made entirely disinterestedly, given that a delegation of the French
Business Confederation (MEDEF—Mouvement des Entreprises de France) was visiting
Belarus in January 2009. While meeting with this delegation, President Alexander
Lukashenka expressed interest in drawing French investors to Belarus. He also stated
that the EU had started treating Belarus as a full-fledged partner and mentioned the EaP
in this context.54
In the case of Armenia, a significant role is played by the EU’s efforts to shut down
a nuclear power plant in Mecamor that does not meet today’s safety standards. Armenia
is only ready to cooperate on this point if and when it has a new power plant. France is
one of the countries interested in participating in this project. It presumably expects that
the development of EU-Armenian cooperation within the framework of the EaP will
make it easy for French companies to participate in the modernisation of the Armenian
nuclear power sector, while this involvement would be presented as a French
contribution to the development of the EaP.
In November 2008, President Sarkozy declared that the EaP would enable
a rapprochement between Azerbaijan and the EU, and that France would strive to make
the EaP serve the interests of Azerbaijan. He did not present any more specific
proposals. It was thus possible to presume that France was favourably inclined to the
EU’s greater involvement within the framework of the EaP in the resolution of the crisis
in Nagorno-Karabakh, something that would strengthen its role in the region, favour
stability in the South Caucasus, would be consistent with Azerbaijani interests and with
those of Armenia, which has close ties with France; finallu this would also reduce
Armenia’s dependence on Russia.
France is also analysing the EaP in the context of its relations with third countries.
In February 2009, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner spoke in support of the
idea that such countries as Russia and Turkey might also participate in some EaP
projects.55 Nicolas Sarkozy stressed that these steps are not aimed against any country,
and that the EU wanted to have conflict-free relations with Russia. French media on
many occasions carried information about the negative way in which the EaP was
viewed by the Russian authorities, which perceive it as an attempt to isolate Russia.
Interestingly, certain Russian politicians and media quite readily make reference to the
supposed disfavour with which France regards the EaP. Moreover, France is counting
on the growth of cooperation between the EU and the new US administration in the
post-Soviet area. In its view, the EaP will play a positive role here, as it will show that
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54 See Alexander Lukashenko: Belarus Is Interested in Developing Business with French
Companies, 26.01.2009, www.belta.by.
55 Conseil affaires générales et relations extérieures. Point de presse du Ministre des affaires
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“while rejecting the logic of isolating Russia, one can propose an alternative to the logic
of the Russian ‘zone of influence.’”56 (ASze)
Germany
The stabilisation and modernisation of the EU’s Eastern partners is in Germany’s
political and economic interest. The German reactions to the Eastern Partnership have
been largely determined by that country’s earlier involvement in the strengthening of
the European Neighbourhood Policy’s Eastern dimension. During its presidency in the
first half of 2007, Germany proposed that the EU’s neighbours be presented with an
attractive and broad-based proposal for cooperation (aufgewertete
Nachbarschaftspolitik, ENP+); also greater emphasis within ENP was then placed on
energy issues.57
The Polish- and Swedish-initiated Eastern Partnership is viewed in terms of
continuation, as a step in the right direction initially defined by Germany.58 It is
regarded as a new impulse to expand cooperation with post-Soviet countries, especially
in view of its having been anchored within the ENP. Unlike France’s original proposal
for a Union for the Mediterranean, the Polish-Swedish initiative is seen as devoid of any
major controversy. It was backed by Chancellor Angela Merkel during her visit to
Gdañsk on 17 June 2008,59 and this support was repeated on several occasions by
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier.60 He also endorsed the efforts to
have the project fleshed out quickly, as undertaken by the Czech Republic upon its
assumption of EU Council presidency.61
Germany appreciates the Eastern Partnership’s potential for ensuring stabilisation
and security in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood.62 In reaction to the war in Georgia,
German politicians proposed to intensify ENP, beef up economic cooperation, and
increase German and EU development aid to the Union’s neighbours to the East.63 A
Commission communication was discussed and analysed in March 2009 at the
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62 “Regierungserklärung des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, zu
den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates am 11./12. Dezember 2008 vor dem Deutschen Bundestag am
18. Dezember 2008 in Berlin,” Bulletin, no. 141-1, vol. 18, December 2008.
63 See, in particular, “Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD Sicherheit, Stabilität und
Demokratie im Südkaukasus fördern,” Druksache 16/12102.
Bundestag’s committees for foreign affairs and for the European Union. While the
Eastern Partnership idea was fully approved, doubts emerged with respect to its
individual aspects. The CDU ruled out treating EaP as a preparatory step before EU
entry, the FDP wished the relationships between the Partnership and the ENP to be
specified in greater detail, and the Left was interested in the participation criteria to be
required from Belarus.64 The SDP did not want the project to be a “vehicle” for some
foreign politicians,65 while the Left Party suggested its concept was strategically linked
to NATO’s expansion to the East.66 The Eastern Partnership was also discussed at a joint
session of German and Polish MPs representing their respective parliaments’ foreign
affairs committees.67
In German debates about EaP, attempts have always been made to define the
initiative’s role in relations with Russia. Despite a certain change in the perception of
that country in the aftermath of the Georgia crisis, Germany has sought to restrict EaP’s
potentially adverse impact upon relations with its most important political and
economic partner in Eastern Europe. It is emphasised that EaP is by no means
anti-Russian or aimed to “force Russia out of its neighbourhood,”68 rather, the EaP
development and implementation should run parallel to relations with Russia, to be
based on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.69 German support for EaP was
very likely made contingent on other member states’ consent to resumption of PCA talks
with Russia. From the German government’s perspective, EaP development requires
a further intensification of relations with Russia, also as part of the EaP itself—by letting
Russia in on certain projects if the country demonstrates its “will and readiness.”70 A
similar approach has been taken in respect of Turkey.
The German support for EaP is largely underpinned by the perception of EaP as
an alternative to membership, to be achieved by means of a tightening up (Verdichtung)
of relations, in the context of a general aversion to the EU’s continued enlargement. The
proposal for the accession prospect to be kept for EaP partners, which Czech Foreign
Minister Karel Schwarzenberg put forward in the Bundestag on 18 March 2008, met
with a tough stance on the part of the CDU, according to which only Croatia could be
considered as new entrant in the near future. For the SPD, too, EaP is no kind of
a “waiting room,” but at best a “place for workout and preparations for future
accession.”71
Belarus’ participation in EaP is seen as desirable and acceptable, due to an
ongoing “mild opening up” towards greater room for the opposition. President
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Lukashenka has been criticised at the Bundestag. It has also been demanded to link
easing up on Belarus and the meeting of certain conditions by the country’s
government.72 Other EaP countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia) have come under criticism as
well.
The proposal to increase EaP funding was assessed by Chancellor Merkel as an
“open question, requiring clarification.” And Minister Steinmeier accepted the need for
the project to be properly backed financially. He saw the Commission proposal as
“realistic,”73 especially in the context of the Eastern partners’ requirements in
connection with the ongoing economic crisis.
Germany’s expectations of EaP are reflected in the concept of a modern
European “Eastern policy,” as formulated by Steinmeier: closer ties with Ukraine,
partnership with Russia, democratisation of Belarus, cooperation with Central Asia, and
prosperous collaboration on the Black Sea and in the Caucasus.74 Germany proposes
that EaP be coordinated with other regional initiatives under ENP, especially Black Sea
Synergy, determined to avoid a “costly and ineffective” duplication of structures. (RF)
Greece
Greece, as a Mediterranean country, is traditionally involved in the development
of relations with the EU’s Southern neighbours. At the same time, the Black Sea basin is
a natural connector and region of cooperation with the majority of the EU’s Eastern
neighbours, and this explains Greece’s interest in the development of the Black Sea
Synergy. Russia is Greece’s principal partner in the post-Soviet area, given the
civilisational, religious and energy ties, as well as the two countries’ position on the
Cyprus question. Greece’s relations with the other countries of Eastern Europe and the
South Caucasus are less significant.
There is no wider debate about Eastern Partnership in Greece. Pronouncements
on this subject are dominated by the EU discourse concerning the initiative. It is
worthwhile to note, among other things, the institutional differences between the
Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean (the EaP is at times presented as
a “mini” version of the UM) and the significance of the war in Georgia for the
development of the initiative with regard to the Eastern neighbours.
Greece declares that the EaP will bring benefits to the countries of Eastern Europe
and the South Caucasus and that it will bring them closer to the EU.75 In Greek expert
milieus, voices can be heard that the EaP is one of the elements of the “association plus”
strategy with Eastern European and South Caucasus countries, seen as an alternative to
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these countries’ “partial” or “limited” membership in the EU.76 The Greek minister of
foreign affairs, Dora Bakoyannis, supports the idea of reinforcing the EaP and expressed
support for the steps taken by the Czech EU presidency in this sphere. The EaP is
perceived in Greece as one of the instruments for preventing conflicts that has become
particularly significant in the context of the war in Georgia in August 2008. According to
the Greeks, the EaP is also one of the elements of the construction of the EU’s global
position intended to enable the EU to act cohesively on the international stage and to
cooperate with the United States on an equal footing.77
Greek politicians do not show any fears about the EaP’s influence on the EU’s
cooperation with Mediterranean countries. Rather, the EaP initiative is presented as yet
another instrument of EU influence on its Eastern neighbours, in addition to the ENP and
the Black Sea Synergy. Nevertheless, one can perceive Greece’s fear that the Black Sea
cooperation will be weakened. In February 2009, Greece, along with Bulgaria and
Romania, presented a non-paper, proposing a reinforcement of the Synergy modelled
on the EaP. This proposal did not meet with the interest of the remaining EU members.
Greece, along with Germany, Romania and Bulgaria, wanted the declaration of the
European Council of March 2009 to stress the complementarity of the Synergy with the
Partnership.
Hope is expressed in Greece that the EaP funds will facilitate the involvement of
Greek companies in chosen countries of the region, such as Azerbaijan. Moreover, one
can presume that in the context of the Greece’s 2009 presidency of the OSCE, it may
wish to use the EaP as an instrument to resolve so-called “frozen conflicts” in Eastern
Europe and the South Caucasus. This applies particularly to the conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh. (ASze)
Hungary
Hungary’s policy towards Eastern Europe is directed mainly at relations with
Russia and Ukraine. The other countries of the region and those of the Caucasus play
a lesser role in Hungary’s Eastern policy. Hungary has actively supported the
establishment of the ENP from the very beginning, stressing the need to develop its
Eastern dimension. The Hungarian authorities also firmly emphasised the necessity to
maintain a balance between the Eastern dimension of the ENP and collaboration
between the EU and Russia.
Hungary supported the Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership initiative decisively
and confirmed this position during successive meetings of Visegrád Group prime
ministers.78 The Hungarian authorities treat the EaP not only as a beneficial complement
of existing instruments of the ENP Eastern dimension, but also as a tool for supporting
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countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus on their path to EU membership.
The Hungarians are aware that some EU members could view the Polish-Swedish
initiative as competitive to the Union for the Mediterranean project and, for this reason,
they called for the working out of a compromise in the matter of financing both
dimensions of the ENP as quickly as possible.79
The Hungarian government supports the forms of deeper collaboration with
countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus mentioned in the Partnership
project, including the creation of free trade zones and the adoption of a road map for
achieving visa free travel. Both those elements, according to the Hungarian
government, can serve to stabilise the situation in Georgia. The Hungarians think that
the EU should encourage this country to carry out internal reforms and to introduce
effective democratic mechanisms, while stressing that collaboration with all countries
of the South Caucasus should be pursued.80 The Hungarians see the role of the EaP with
regard to Moldova in a similar manner. The creation of a network of ties linking this
country with the EU should contribute to the final resolution of the conflict in the region
of the Transnistria. In the opinion of the Hungarian government, thanks to the EaP the
population of this region may one day opt for its reintegration with the rest of the
country.
The most important addressee of the EaP initiative in Hungary’s view is Ukraine.
In the program of the Hungarian presidency of the Visegrád Group (July 2009 to June
2010), presently under preparation, support for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine
and the countries of the Western Balkans will be listed as a priority, as will the
implementation of the EaP.81 The Hungarian chairmanship of in the V4 and its
presidency of the Council of the European Union scheduled for the first half of 2011
could favour the implementation of the EaP and the promotion of Ukraine’s
Euro-Atlantic aspirations.82 According to Hungary’s left-wing government, the
realisation of the EaP cannot contribute to the emergence of new divisions between the
EU and Russia, whereas cooperation with that country lies in the long-term interest of
both the EU and NATO.83 In case of a conflict of interests between Russia and any of the
countries of the Eastern neighbourhood, Hungary might show a tendency to favour
Russian interests, although this could change should the opposition—more critical of
Russia—come to power.84 (RM)
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79 Statement of The Minister for Foreign Affairs, op.cit.
80 Ibidem.
81 Hungary will pursue an active foreign policy characterised by predictability and continuity,
with initiatives of its own in 2009 as well—Foreign Minister Meets Heads of Diplomatic Missions (30
January 2009), www.mfa.gov.hu.
82 In February 2009, the ministers of foreign affairs of Austria and Romania proposed to work out
a cooperation strategy for Danube Basin countries, pointing out that its realisation could begin during the
Hungarian presidency. Hungary have yet to take an official stand on the matter and it is difficult to define
how the possible inclusion of this strategy in the Hungarian program for chairing the EU Council will
affect the implementation of the EaP. See the section devoted to Austria for more on the subject of the
Austrian-Romanian proposal.
83 Ibidem.
84 For a long time, the Fidesz party of former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been actively
critical of the presently ruling MSzP party for its excessively conciliatory stand towards Russia and for
making Hungary dependent on Russian energy. See András Deák, “Diversification in Hungarian Manner:
The Gyurcsány Government’s Energy Policy,” International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs 15,
no. 3–4 (2006), pp. 44–55.
Ireland
The Irish authorities recognise the equal status of all dimensions existing within
the framework of the ENP and reiterate that the EU’s fundamental aim in relations with
its neighbours should be to support democratic change.85 Relations with countries of
Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus do not play any significant role in Ireland’s
foreign policy and the addressees of Eastern Partnership are primarily the beneficiaries
of Ireland’s foreign aid.
Ireland took a positive view of the EaP proposal, treating it as a beneficial
complement of the ENP that will make it possible to support democratic change in
countries that neighbour on the EU and bring them closer to EU norms and standards.
The EaP project was not the subject of a wider debate among Irish political elites. Just as
in case of the neighbourhood policy, the Irish government stressed that the EaP cannot
be treated as a path to EU membership. Proposals to finance the EaP did not give rise to
Irish reservations. In addition, Ireland recognised that it would be most appropriate if
the European Commission coordinated the project. Ireland’s most important partners
among the countries included in the EaP are Ukraine and Moldova. The Irish
government took a positive view of the possibility that third countries, such as Russia
and Turkey, will participate in selected programs. It also shared other EU members’
view about the suspension of diplomatic sanctions against Belarus, stating that the
present isolation policy had not produced the expected results, and that strengthening
contacts with Belarus could more effectively incline it to undertake democratic
reforms.86 (BZ)
Italy
Italy perceives the ENP as an instrument for conducting EU policy in the
Mediterranean, which is the principal region of interest in Italian foreign policy. It is
firmly opposed to interpreting the tightening of relations with the EU’s Eastern
neighbours within the framework of the ENP as a pre-accession strategy. Bringing
countries of the Eastern neighbourhood closer to the EU can not entail EU membership
in the medium-term perspective. Italy’s privileged bilateral relations with Russia, both
political and economical, stand out in the context of its contacts with countries of
Eastern Europe. On the EU forum, Italy strives to maintain very good relations between
the EU and Russia, even at the cost of the other countries of the Eastern neighbourhood.
It is also cautious in supporting initiatives that could be seen by Russia as aimed against it.
The Eastern Partnership proposal announced by Poland and Sweden in May
2008, and the European Commission’s communiqué from December 2008, did not
meet with any particular interest on the part of Italian politicians or other participants in
the public debate. From the Italian point of view, the problem with the Polish-Swedish
proposal was the fact that the Eastern Partnership was not sufficiently clearly anchored
in the ENP framework. The Commission’s communiqué was greeted more positively,
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given that a “communitisation” of the project took place, according to the Italians. Thus,
the fact that the Eastern Partnership emerged as a “dimension” of the ENP, and not as an
autonomous project, was crucial in securing Italy’s support for the tightening of
relations with the EU’s Eastern neighbours. What’s more, given the differentiation of the
addressees, it is not strictly regarded as regional cooperation on the model of the Black
Sea Synergy or the Northern Dimension.
As a matter of principle, the Italians support the Partnership as an initiative
strengthening the EU’s relations with its Eastern neighbours. Italy also takes a positive
view on the deepening of economic integration with the Eastern neighbourhood
countries and the acceleration of the legal and regulatory rapprochement between EaP
countries and the EU. However, given the key importance of the Southern
neighbourhood, Italy does not consider the EaP as a project of strategic significance.
Italian reservations about the Partnership are related, among others, to the issue
of its financing. Italian representatives stressed that they would agree to increase funds
earmarked for the Eastern neighbours, on the condition that the allocations for
cooperation with Southern neighbourhood would be increased. The proposal of
liberalising the visa regime gave rise to great scepticism. According to Italian
representatives, this process should take place gradually, and countries of the Eastern
neighbourhood should be treated individually. The Italians fear that, presumably, the
introduction of significant facilitations in the movement of people from countries
subject of the EaP could form a precedent and strengthen similar demands from the
countries of Northern Africa. They also point out that before any decisions are made on
this question one should wait for the assessment of the implementation of the
agreements on readmission and visa facilitations that were signed with Ukraine and
Moldova and which came into force in 2008.
During the discussions on EaP in February and March 2009, Italy called for the
inclusion of Russia and Turkey in the projects realised within the framework of the
Partnership and pointed to the importance of achieving full complementarity between
the EaP and the Black Sea Synergy. Italians underlined that the reinforcement of
relations with the EU’s Eastern neighbours within the framework of the EaP could not be
pursued as a project directed against Russia. Italy supported the Commission’s
proposals about the institutionalisation of the Partnership, emphasising at the same time
that EaP institutional solutions should not be excessively extended, but more use should
be made of existing structures within the Council and the Commission.
The prospect of the EU’s opening in its relations with Belarus produced positive
reactions in Italy. In February 2009 a meeting took place between the Italian minister of
foreign affairs, Franco Frattini, and his Belarusian counterpart Siarhiej Martynau. During
the meeting a declaration was signed about the expansion of bilateral consultations. In
March 2009, when decisions about the EU’s policy with regard to Belarus were made,
Italy called for the prolongation of the suspension of the diplomatic sanctions against
that country. (AK)
Latvia
Latvia firmly supports the development of the ENP. Given a common history and
geographical proximity, it is actively engaged in tightening relations with the EU’s
Eastern neighbours, while stressing that political and economic stability in the region
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will increase the security of the EU. Latvia is striving to support democratic changes in
the region by sharing its experience from its own political transformations. Through
active measures aimed at developing relations with its neighbours, Latvia also attempts
to reinforce its own position in its relations with Russia. These relations aren’t easy given
the large Russian minority living in Latvia and close economic and energy ties between
two countries.
Latvian authorities greeted the Eastern Partnership project enthusiastically, as an
initiative favouring stability, security, and economic development in the region.87 It
should be noted that before the Polish-Swedish EaP proposal was announced, the
Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to the project of a Union for the
Mediterranean by stating that there was no equivalent initiative for the EU’s Eastern
neighbours and pointed to the need to create a framework for multilateral cooperation
with those countries. Latvia saw possibilities for the development of practical
cooperation in trade, energy, environmental protection, justice and internal affairs, and
it called for the establishment of an inter-parliamentary dialogue and for cooperation
with other countries of the region.88
Latvia recognises that their country can become actively involved in the
development of the EaP and share its experience and its close relations with countries
included in the EaP. Latvia sees an opportunity for itself to play the role of a bridge
between the West and the East, and to assist the EU’s Eastern neighbours in
understanding the aims of the EaP and the ENP as well as the EU and its values.89
According to Latvia, the EaP is to adapt the EU’s neighbourhood policy to the specific
needs of the countries located to its East. This will require an individual approach to
each of them. Latvian president Valdis Zatlers spoke enthusiastically of the EaP, and
emphasised that it offered additional funds and concentrated the EU’s attention in the
“right direction.” According to Zatlers, the EaP is evidence of the EU’s far-sighted policy
and will serve its neighbours as a support for their reforms.90 The policy declaration of
the Valdis Dombrovski’s government, sworn in as prime minister at the beginning of
March 2009, also mentions the EaP. Among the country’s foreign policy aims, it
mentions supporting the implementation of the EaP by sharing Latvian experiences
about reforms, the improvement of economic conditions and the reinforcement of the
justice administration system and security in the region.91
In November 2008, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and
Sweden issued a common declaration stressing the significance of regional cooperation
with EU neighbours to the East. In this document, the EaP was singled out as an initiative
offering a new form of closer cooperation leading to the adoption of EU regulations and
standards, the creation of deeper free trade areas and, in the longer perspective, the
annulment of the visa requirement. This document also stressed the significance of the
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project’s institutionalisation through the appointment of a special EaP coordinator and
the organisation of ministerial meetings or work groups at the level of senior officials.92
(BZ)
Lithuania
Given its geographical location and the significance of the Russian factor,
Lithuania values political stability and economic development in the region of Eastern
Europe and the South Caucasus. Lithuania shows great interest in the shaping of the
EU’s relationship with its immediate surroundings by unequivocally supporting the
ENP. While supporting the strengthening of the EU’s neighbourhood policy in relation
to the countries of the Eastern dimension of the ENP, it stresses the principles of
conditionality and differentiation. It is against treating the ENP as an alternative to
membership and is pushing for an “open door” policy. Lithuania sees the need to
increase the participation of Eastern partners in the EU’s developmental assistance and
proposes a greater coordination of measures that have been pursued individually until
now. It was Lithuania, together with Poland, that convinced the European Council at the
December 2007 meeting to add to the Conclusions a remark about the need for
developing multilateral forms of cooperation between the EU and its Eastern
neighbours.
Lithuania took a positive view of the Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership
initiative, as one that is concordant with Lithuanian intentions of increasing the
significance of the Eastern neighbourhood in EU policy. Lithuania is especially counting
on the working out, on the basis of the EaP, of a new formula for relations between the
EU and countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus within the framework of the
ENP. It also sees the influence of the EaP on the shaping of bilateral relations within the
EU.93 This favourable rhetoric is being followed by important political signals which
have been expressed in the Warsaw Joint Statement signed by Lithuania on 24
November 2008. The signatories (the Visegrád countries, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia,
Romania and Sweden) called for the EU to offer its Eastern neighbours new forms of
cooperation within the framework of the EaP for the purpose of bringing them closer to
EU norms and standards, to establish free trade zones, to initiate the process of
facilitating the movement of people, with abandoning visas as a long-term goal. In
addition, the signatories supported the idea of creating effective institutional
cooperation mechanisms, preferably based on a special coordinator for the EaP and
regular meetings of ministers and experts.94
In December 2008, Lithuanian parliamentarians took a favourable view of the
European Commission communiqué on the EaP.95 They stated that this document was
the appropriate response to the pro-European aspirations of the EU’s Eastern
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neighbours—that it supports their reforming efforts and, from the EU side, that it
constitutes an expression of a common desire for greater cooperation and partnership.96
Lithuania supports the proposal of concluding association agreements, facilitating the
movement of people (with visa-free travel as a long term goal) and the strengthening of
cooperation in energy security.97 Lithuania also stresses the support for the
democratisation process and the rule of law in neighbouring countries as tools of
political stabilisation and economic development.98 The Eastern Partnership Initiative is
seen as one of the two main tools (along with the Union for the Mediterranean) for the
initiation of change in the EU’s neighbourhood aimed at building a stable and
predictable immediate vicinity. Lithuania sees the need for balancing the Southern
dimension through greater involvement in developing relations with the EU’s Eastern
neighbours covered by the ENP. Lithuania, similarly to Poland, places an emphasis on
the need for the European Commission to define specific projects and initiatives along
with a schedule for their implementation and a clear financing system.
Following the Georgian crisis, the EaP initiative began to be perceived in
Lithuania as a factor that could have great influence on EU-Russian relations.99 There is
a tendency to see the EaP as a tool in the EU’s policy toward Russia. As far as the
possibility of including Belarus to the EaP is concerned, the most common view in
Lithuania is that the Partnership could stimulate the desired changes. In the opinion of
the Lithuanian authorities, inviting Belarus to the EaP should not be treated as a prize for
the changes expected, but rather as a pragmatic move that accelerates them. Belarus
could be invited to participate on the condition that it shows the will to evolve in the
direction of an open society and a democratic political system.100 Despite the routine
stressing of the principle of conditionality, Lithuania is the EU member that most
actively aims to include Belarus in the EaP.
Lithuania has become actively involved in promoting the EaP among other EU
members.101 Its promotion activities were also conducted among the EaP countries.
Toward the end of 2008, the Lithuanian minister of foreign affairs visited the most
important beneficiaries in Lithuania’s viewpoint, i.e., Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus, for
the purpose of discussing questions connected with the EaP initiative and the
development of bilateral relations.
At times, the Partnership is treated by Lithuanian representatives as
a pre-accession package despite the fact that it does not include the prospect of EU
membership. Lithuania holds great hope with the project as far as rapprochement
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between its addressees and Euro-Atlantic integration structures is concerned.102 In
Lithuanian assessments, there is a need for a differentiated approach based on varying
expectations with regard to the beneficiaries of the EaP. Lithuania expects the most
rapid results to be achieved in negotiations with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova,
something that should then positively influence the tightening of relations with
Azerbaijan, Belarus and Armenia.103 Another important element is energy cooperation.
It should be pointed out that these areas were already identified as priority issues within
the context of the ENP.104 The EaP is understood as yet another undertaking, in addition
to the Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, that can be realised complementarily and
which can contribute to the crystallisation of a common policy on a specific issue that is
important for Lithuania. (EW, RT)
Luxembourg
Russia, which is treated by Luxembourg as an important political and economic
partner, plays an important role in Luxembourg’s perception of the regions of Eastern
Europe and the South Caucasus. Luxembourg supports the European Neighbourhood
and Partnership Policy, even if it is not the object of its special interest. The Luxembourg
authorities declare that in connection with the 2004 EU enlargement it is necessary to
enter into close cooperation with the new neighbours, because their rapprochement to
the EU will contribute to increased stability in the immediate vicinity of the EU. In 2005,
the Luxembourg EU presidency was involved in the formulation of an understanding
with the European Parliament on the subject of the European Neighbourhood and
Partnership Instrument.
The Luxembourg authorities are the proponents of a balanced approach to the
Southern and Eastern neighbours. They are of the opinion that the stability of the
countries neighbouring on the EU to the East is important to all Europeans, and intensive
cooperation with countries of the Mediterranean basin cannot take place at the expense
of the EU’s Eastern neighbours. Luxembourg recently supported the Eastern Partnership
while drawing attention to the need for a balanced development of relations with
neighbours to the South within the context of the Union for the Mediterranean. The
Luxembourg authorities expect that the EaP initiative will contribute to the
reinforcement of relations with the EU’s Eastern neighbours.105 (RK)
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Malta
The implementation of the ENP in keeping with the concept of “all besides
institutions” is one of the priorities of Maltese foreign policy. Malta’s interest in the
policy is limited to the Southern dimension and it identifies the Neighbourhood Policy
with Mediterranean Policy. In the opinion of this state, the ENP and the Union for the
Mediterranean increase the stability of the EU’s Southern neighbourhood and Malta’s
role in this region. The pronouncements of the Maltese government on the subject of
Eastern Partnership limit themselves to vague declarations. In assessing the program of
the Czech presidency, the Maltese foreign minister, Tonio Borg, stated that he greeted
the reinforcement of the ENP’s Eastern dimension through the realisation of the Eastern
Partnership with satisfaction.106 Malta views this as an important step in the context of
the events in Georgia.
When there is talk of the Eastern Partnership, it is usually in connection with
Mediterranean policy. Malta stresses the necessity to keep a balance between both
dimensions of the ENP. It notes that in addition to bilateral steps taken in connection
with Eastern dimension decisions (EaP ones as well), the EU’s relations with
Mediterranean countries should also be developed. In this context, the important thing
for Malta is tightening the EU’s ties with counties of the Arab League. In pursuing
multilateral undertakings within the framework of the Eastern Partnership, particular
attention should be paid to the implementation of projects of the Union for the
Mediterranean. According to Malta, if additional funds are to be allocated for the EU’s
Eastern neighbours in connection with the realisation of the EaP, the EU should also
financially support the countries of the ENP’s Southern dimension.107
The Maltese government supports the principle of complementariness of the
Eastern Partnership with other EU regional initiatives, including the Black Sea Synergy,
which Malta supports.108 It can also be expected to support the participation of third
countries, especially Russia, in EaP projects. Given Russia’s significance in the sphere of
security, Malta pointed to the necessity of strengthening EU-Russian relations, seeing in
this step a condition for the success of the ENP in its Eastern dimension. (ASzy)
Netherlands
The Netherlands is acting on the assumption that a stable and successfully
developing Eastern neighbourhood is in the interests of the entire EU, as this ensures,
among other things, the security of the EU’s external boundaries, the safety of energy
supplies and trade and investment benefits. This is one of the reasons why the
Netherlands has granted much developmental aid to Eastern European and South
Caucasian countries to which the Eastern Partnership is addressed. According to the
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Dutch authorities, the EU’s relations with neighbouring countries should not lead to
membership, however. Reiterating this reservation has become an almost ritual element
of the Dutch approach to the functioning of the ENP and to the future of this policy.
The Netherlands welcomed the Eastern Partnership, with this acceptance rooted
primarily in the fact that the Eastern Partnership does not explicitly address the issue of
the EU membership of countries to which it is addressed. What’s more, it seems to be
rather close to the Dutch concept of a new form of partnership (the so-called partenariat)
between the EU and the countries of the Eastern dimension of the neighbourhood
policy, one that assumes a more advanced form of cooperation going beyond the
framework of the ENP, but still excluding EU membership. This new form of partnership
should be implemented if the potential offered by the ENP is fully used up.109 This
concept emerged during the course of the debate which took place in the Netherlands
in 2005, following the negative outcome of the referendum on the ratification of the
Constitutional Treaty. The proposal for a new partnership was included in the coalition
agreement concluded in February 2007 between the Christian-Democratic Party
(CDA), the Labour Party (PvdA) and the Christian Union (ChristenUnie).
A possible manifestation of the Dutch government’s interest in the EaP project is
the fact that, toward the end of 2008, it turned to the Advisory Council on International
Affairs (AIV), requesting the preparation of an analysis of the EaP initiative in terms of its
added value in relation to the ENP, of possible Russian participation, and of solutions
other than EU membership that would enable an intensification of relations with EaP
addressees.110 The AIV stated that the EaP will enable the intensification of economic
relations through the creation of deeper free trade areas, noting that the EaP was an
opportunity for multilateral cooperation between the EU and beneficiary countries,
whereas the present ENP formula gave priority to bilateral relations. It also indicated
that Russia and Turkey should not be passed by in the process of development of
relations with the EU’s Eastern neighbours. On the other hand, the AIV was critical of
the idea that the development of the EaP should omit the prospect of membership, as
such a prospect could be an enormous stimulus for the implementation of political and
economic reforms.111
The government in The Hague treats the EaP as an instrument that can be used for
the further democratisation of the EU’s Eastern neighbours and also for the deepening of
cooperation in areas such as energy, the economy, environmental protection, justice
and respect for human rights. The Netherlands took a positive view of many ideas
contained in the Commission’s communication of December 2008.112 It does not
oppose the idea of concluding association agreements with countries included in the
Partnership. It is also rather favourably inclined towards the proposal of creating deeper
free trade areas, seeing in them an opportunity to give more dynamism to trade with
those countries, especially with Ukraine. It shows a degree of caution, however,
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towards the introduction of visa facilitations, stressing that it is necessary to assess the
solutions already in place. The Netherlands has expressed doubts as to the added value
of the “mobility and security pacts” proposed by the Commission, in comparison to
already existing forms of cooperation in the sphere of movement of people.
The Netherlands questioned the European Commission’s EaP financing
proposal, especially the idea of allocating additional funds from the budget in the
amount of €350 million, which would go to support the European Neighbourhood and
Partnership Instrument. The government in The Hague, which usually views quite
sceptically any increase of funds for the neighbourhood policy, stressed that carrying
out the EaP should take place within the existing financial framework. This stance arises
primarily from the Netherlands’ status as a net payee to the EU budget and its fear that it
will have to sustain the cost of the new financial obligations.
The attitude of the Netherlands to Belarus’ possible participation in the EaP was
negative. This was the result of The Hague’s critical assessment of the human rights
situation in that country. The Dutch government took the position that Belarus would
not be able to join the EaP project until its authorities took real steps to liberalise the
political system there. Ultimately, however, it agreed to Belarus’ inclusion in the
Partnership. (MK)
Poland
The countries of Eastern Europe occupy a special place in Poland’s foreign policy
due to the political and socio-economic ties it has with them. Their stabilisation through
democratisation and the building of a market economy has been one of the most
important goals of the Republic of Poland post-1989. Poland has been emphasising that
there is a need for intensifying EU efforts to consolidate the ties between the Union and
the Eastern neighbourhood countries embraced by the European Neighbourhood
Policy and has for many years promoted an “open-door” policy towards Eastern Europe
in the EU. It believes that dialogue and cooperation between the EU and Russia are
indispensable, although it is opposed to perceiving and assessing EU initiatives
addressed to the Eastern neighbourhood from the angle of Russia’s interests. In its
opinion, assistance in socio-political and economic transformations in ENP countries
should be one of the EU’s chief objectives, the pursuit of which should not be combined
with, let alone made contingent on, the development of the EU’s relations with Russia.
Poland showed particular interest in the development of relations with the
Eastern neighbours by the enlarged EU already at the start of its accession negotiations
in 1998. This was confirmed and expanded in the Foreign Ministry document adopted
in July 2001 entitled “Eastern Policy of the European Union in the Context of its
Enlargement by the Inclusion of East-Central European Countries—the Polish View.” In
January 2003, the Ministry built on that concept in non-paper form: “Polish Proposals
Concerning the Future Shape of the Enlarged EU toward the New Eastern
Neighbours.”113 In this document, Poland formulated a proposal for the expansion of
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EU’s relations with the Eastern neighbours: the inclusion of Russia in the European
Economic Space in the medium term and the signing of association agreements with
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, provided the latter country underwent democratisation.
That document also took into account the possibility of Ukraine’s admission to the EU in
the long term. The Polish 2003 proposals were a voice in the debate on the future
relations of the enlarged EU with its Eastern neighbours. This debate produced the
concept of the European Neighbourhood Policy that has been implemented since May
2004. However, not being an EU member yet, Poland had limited influence on the final
shape of the EU policy toward its Eastern neighbours.
Following its admission to the EU, Poland cooperated closely with other
Visegrád Group countries to strengthen the Eastern dimension of ENP.114 These
problems were also the subject of numerous consultations and campaigns launched
together with the Baltic states. The objective, in the most general terms, was to devise
a new concept taking into account in a greater measure the expectations of the Eastern
ENP countries and also to convince the “old” EU members to expand relations
therewith. Poland was also pointing to the disparities between the Southern and the
Eastern dimensions of the ENP, which lacked mechanisms for multilateral cooperation.
These efforts led to the adoption by the European Council in December 2007 of
a Polish-Lithuanian proposal for the development of the Southern and Eastern
dimensions of ENP not only through bilateral, but also through multilateral actions.
In March 2008, after the meeting of the European Council that gave the go-ahead
to the implementation of the Union for the Mediterranean, Polish Foreign Minister
Rados³aw Sikorski promised to present a proposal for deeper relations with the Eastern
neighbours embraced by the ENP. This was because Poland expected that, after the
adoption of the initiative aimed at invigorating the Southern dimension of the ENP, it
would be easier to obtain the EU’s consent to the deepening of relations with the Eastern
neighbours. The Eastern Partnership initiative was jointly presented by Poland and
Sweden at the meeting of foreign ministers on 26–27 May 2008. It is worth noting that
the Czech Republic, which in April 2008 submitted a proposal for the deepening of the
Eastern dimension of the ENP, gave its firm support to this initiative. It also participated
in the development of a more detailed EaP design by Poland and Sweden, which was
submitted to the European Commission in October 2008.
After the GAERC meeting held in May, Poland focused on canvassing support for
the EaP initiative both in the EU institutions and among individual member states.115 It
held intensive consultations with the European Commission aimed at including the
proposals contained in the initiative in the communication on EaP prepared by the
European Commission. It also sought to form a “front” of countries supporting the
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115 More on this topic in: Informacja Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych na temat polskiej
inicjatywy Partnerstwa Wschodniego, 7th Senate of the Republic of Poland, typescript (461) of the 35th
sitting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, pp. 4–5, www.senat.gov.pl.
initiative. On 24 November 2008, Warsaw hosted a meeting of Visegrád Group
countries as well as Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Sweden. Its participants
were in favour of the EU offering its Eastern neighbours new forms of cooperation within
the EaP framework with a view to helping them get closer to EU standards and norms,
establishing free trade zones and launching a process of facilitating the movement of
people, with the abolition of visas envisaged in the long term. They voiced support for
the idea of appointing a special coordinator for EaP affairs and holding regular meetings
of ministers and experts.116
Poland has been engaged in intensive consultations with Germany, and the EaP
was also discussed at meetings at various levels with the remaining EU members,
including France and Britain. It has also talked to its neighbours, including Ukraine. In
January 2009, Poland organised consultations between the Visegrád Group and Russia
on the subject of EaP, among other topics.
The Polish-Swedish initiative and actions for its adoption by the Community are
a logical component of Poland’s foreign policy. After all, the objective of the Eastern
Partnership is to consolidate socio-political and economic transformations of the
countries of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus.117 Initially, the absence of any mention
of EU enlargement in the proposal aroused some reservations among certain Polish
political forces. Law and Justice (PiS), the biggest opposition party, dismissed the plan as
not ambitious enough and “defensive,”118 with some criticism too coming from within
the ruling Civic Platform (PO) party.119 Fears were also voiced by politicians from the
peasant party in connection with the planned establishment of an EU-Ukraine free trade
zone and the possibility of subsidising farmers from outside the EU.120 In the end,
however, no Polish political force came out against the Eastern Partnership.
Similarly as many other EU members supporting a further eastward expansion of
the EU, Poland regards the Eastern Partnership as a pragmatic response to “enlargement
fatigue.” In Poland’s opinion, an initiative speaking expressly about EU enlargement
would stand no chance of being accepted by all the EU members.121 Meanwhile, in the
present format, the EaP can help to bring the countries to which this initiative is
addressed significantly closer to the EU, and in the case of those countries that show
such aspirations and display a sufficient level of determination—to actually prepare
them for integration. According to the Polish authorities, an important role will be
played by the EU’s association agreements with the neighbours, the liberalisation of visa
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typescript of the 35th sitting of the 6th Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 12 February 2009, p. 251,
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temat polskiej inicjatywy Partnerstwa Wschodniego..., op.cit., pp. 21–22.
120 Cf. e.g., the statement by Senator Jan Olech (PO) in the debate over Informacja Ministerstwa
Spraw Zagranicznych na temat polskiej inicjatywy Partnerstwa Wschodniego..., p. 13.
121 Informacja Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych na temat polskiej inicjatywy Partnerstwa
Wschodniego..., pp. 3, 5.
policies and the establishment of a deepened free trade zone. Finally, the foreign policy
reports presented by Foreign Minister Rados³aw Sikorski to the Sejm in 2008 and 2009
also confirm that Poland has not abandoned the striving for an eastward enlargement of
the EU.
The adoption of the EaP by the European Council in March 2009 did not end
Poland’s efforts for the benefit of its development and implementation. Without waiting
for the implementation of the EaP by the Commission, the Polish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs is planning to launch the first pilot projects financed out of the national budget.
They concern the promotion of human rights, regional development and the protection
of cultural heritage, among other things. Poland has also been emphasising the
importance of coordinated efforts of the member states and the European Commission
with regard to development aid channelled to EaP beneficiaries. It proposes intensified
exchange of information on that subject and the combining of member states’ projects
with initiatives of the European Commission. Meanwhile, the Polish proposals for the
establishment of the position of a special coordinator for the Partnership and also for
setting up a small secretarial force, or at least hiring additional European Commission
staff dealing with the EaP, remain valid. Poland has also been advocating the creation of
a financial mechanism making it possible to establish cooperation in the
implementation of the EaP with countries from outside the EU, e.g. USA, Canada or
Japan. (BW)
Portugal
Given its political, economic and energy ties with the Mediterranean region,
Portugal is primarily involved in the realisation of the Southern dimension of the ENP.
Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus are almost absent in that country’s foreign
policy, and Russia is Portugal’s largest political and economic partner in the post-Soviet
area. Interest in the problems of Eastern Europe has been slowly rising in the last few
years as a result of EU enlargement and the implementation of the ENP. The most
important factor influencing Portugal’s somewhat greater activeness than in previous
years with regard to the EU’s Eastern neighbours is a growing number of immigrants
from Ukraine and Moldova.
The Eastern Partnership is not a subject of public debate in Portugal. Even in the
context of the parliamentary discussions about the Georgia-Russia conflict, there were
no references to this initiative, although it is under the influence of this conflict that
work on the EaP accelerated. Emphasised was the necessity of building close relations
with Russia, which, as a major EU partner, should not be marginalised.122 The
government’s position is limited to the statement that Portugal accepts the Eastern
Partnership and expects that it will reinforce multilateral cooperation between the EU
and its Eastern neighbours.123 Reservations are voiced as to its financing. Portugal is
rather against allocating additional funds for the Partnership. Given a growing number
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of immigrants from Eastern Europe, Portugal will undoubtedly be cautious with regard
to proposals to introduce significant changes in the visa regime. Portuguese politicians
point to the need to control the EU’s Eastern boundaries and to counter illegal
immigration from the East.124 It can be expected that the Portuguese position in the
matter of the EaP will be similar to that of Spain and France. In the past, Portugal worked
closely with both of them within the framework of the ENP, thus reinforcing the group of
Mediterranean EU members.125 (BW)
Romania
Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus play an important role in Romania’s
foreign policy, and the development of the ENP—primarily of its Eastern dimension—
represents one of the priorities of Romanian policy within the EU. Given shared
historical, ethnic, and economic ties, Romania’s most important partner is Moldova.
Romania calls for this country to be included in the EU’s policy directed at Western
Balkan countries that are candidates for EU membership. Romania’s authorities
perceive their relations with their Eastern neighbours through the prism of their position
on the Black Sea basin. Romania wishes to play the role of a leader in this region and is
interested in the further development of the Black Sea Synergy.
Initially, Romania was rather critical of the EaP project. Its authorities felt that
appropriate consultations were not conducted with them on the subject of an initiative
in a region so important to Romania. Given the fear that the EaP would have a negative
impact on the Black Sea Synergy, Romanian officials stressed that both initiatives have
to be complementary: the EaP could concentrate on bilateral cooperation and the
adaptation of neighbouring countries to EU standards, whereas the Black Sea Synergy
would concentrate on multilateral projects and the building of a zone of security and
trust in the region.126 In this, Romania pointed indirectly to the Black Sea Synergy’s
advantage connected with the fact that is includes not only EU and EaP countries, but
also Turkey and Russia. In February 2009, Romania along with Bulgaria and Greece
presented a non paper proposing a strengthening of the Black Sea Synergy modelled on
the EaP. This proposal did not meet with wider interest on the part of other EU members.
During the same month, the ministers of foreign affairs of Austria and
Romania—Michael Spindelegger and Cristian Diaconescu—presented to the other EU
members a proposal for the creation of an EU strategy for Danube Basin countries.127 If it
were to be realised and if it were to include Ukraine and Moldova and the countries of
the Western Balkans, the EaP would probably lose in significance for Romania and, at
the same time, would bring back controversies having to do with the principle of
complementarity of regional initiatives.
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127 For more on this subject, see the section about Austria.
Romania’s cautious stance with regard to the EaP was also affected by the
equivocal assessment of the initiative by Moldova. The authorities of that country saw
the Partnership as a unilateral EU initiative directed at countries that are less advanced
in their reforms than Moldova and, moreover, one that can be viewed as an attempt to
isolate Russia. There was also anxiety that the association proposal for EU neighbouring
countries could make Moldova’s EU membership prospects more remote. Romania
seemed to share these fears in part.128
Ultimately, Romania stated that the EaP can further transformations and bring
Moldova closer to the EU.129 It did not question the Eastern Partnership project, which
was declared one of Romania’s priorities in the region for the years 2009–2012.130 The
Romanian authorities stress that the new initiative could strengthen the EU’s political
and economic ties with the Eastern part of the continent, especially in the sphere of
energy and transport. They hold the view that the initiative should also support the
European aspirations of countries to which it is addressed.131 From the Romanian
perspective, the EU’s most important partner within the framework of the EaP is
Moldova. In the case o Ukraine, voices have been raised that the EaP could be used to
improve the situation of the Romanian minority in that country. Romania supports
a policy of openness towards Belarus. It expresses the hope that the attitude of the
authorities in this country will change. There are no specific Romanian proposals
concerning cooperation with countries of the South Caucasus within the EaP
framework. (ASze)
Slovakia
The countries of the ENP’s Eastern dimension, especially Ukraine, Belarus and
Moldova, are a priority area of Slovakian foreign policy. For Slovakia, which is located
on a strategic path along which energy is shipped to the EU, the most important country
to the East of the EU is Russia.
Slovakia supports the development of the ENP and, as far as the EU’s Eastern
neighbours are concerned, it treats the Neighbourhood Policy as an instument
supporting those countries’ path toward EU membership. Slovakia supported the
Polish-Swedish project of the Eastern Partnership as one corresponding to its “priority
interests” and treats it as the crowning of its efforts on behalf of the ENP made, among
other, as part of the Visegrád Group. In the opinion of the Slovakian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the concept of the Eastern Partnership meets the requirement of maintaining the
internal cohesiveness of the ENP and properly takes into account the experiences of this
policy in relation to the partners to the East. The EaP is an opportunity to tighten
cooperation and a chance for a “new quality” in their relations with the EU. Slovak
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experts were more critical though and they pointed out, among other things, a lack of
reference to the sectorial approach preferred by the German EU presidency, the
problem of delimitation of multilateral cooperation between the EaP and existing
regional initatives in the Black Sea Basin and an absence of reference to cooperation
with Turkey.132
According to the Slovakian authorities, the EaP is, however, “a very good
preparation to future unification of all parts of Europe in one European project,”133 and
its mechanism will favour close ties between the EU and its Eastern neighbours.
Although the EaP does not include a promise of EU membership, in the future such
a perpective could materialise after candidate countries meet specific conditions.
Slovakia sees “added value” in the EaP because by supporting reforms in partner
countries this will make it possible to create “one common space of values and
principles based on the EU model.”134 Slovakia shows particular interest in the
expansion of a free trade area and he creation of a more friendly visa regime for citizens
of countries included in the EaP.
Slovak diplomats stress that the EaP is not, and cannot be, a project aimed against
any country (especially Russia). Although Slovakia perceives the EaP as an initiative of
strategic significance for the stability and security of the countries of the ENP’s Eastern
dimension and of all the EU, emphasis in the EaP initiative on the problem of
desecuritisation is, according to Slovakia, an advantage of the project. Thanks to this,
the EaP will make it possible for the EU to make full use of its “soft power,” indirectly
contributing to the improvement of international security in the region.
Slovakia declared that it would actively participate in the practical
implementation of the EaP by sharing its own experiences from the transformation and
European integration process.135 In doing so, it drew particular attention to the
multilateral dimension of the EaP and to the possibility of using certain experiences of
Central-European regional cooperation in the East.136
Slovakia is interested in the “maintenance of the attractiveness of the Eastern
Partnership in all participating partner countries.”137 Although it had often pointed in the
past to Ukraine as a country that was mature enough to enjoy a priviledged partnership
with the EU and activey supported Ukrainian integration efforts, it does not at this time
show any will to single out this country. This is related to tensions between Slovakia and
Ukraine that arose during the Ukrainian-Russian gas conflict at the beginning of 2009.
Slovakia is one of the proponents of a conditional inclusion of Belarus in the EaP
and is interested in the growth of cooperation with that country. According to Slovakian
diplomats, thanks to the participation of Belarus in the EaP the EU will obtain an
instrument with which it will be able to influence developments there. As Slovakia
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holds firmly to the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states (it did not
recognise the secession of Kosovo), it would view critically Belarus’ recognition of
Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia, and regard it as a significant obstacle to regional
cooperation within the framework of the EaP. In spite of its very good relations with
Russia, Slovakia criticised the proclamation of independence of the two Georgian
provinces. It is, however, particularly interested that the EaP does not beconme a plane
for EU-Russian disputes. Slovakia did not oppose Russian participation in the realisation
of individual EaP projects and calls for talks with Russia on the subject of the EaP, such
as in a “V4+” format (such consultations took place for the first time in January 2009 on
Poland’s initiative).
Slovakia supported Poland in its efforts to increase funds for the EaP and it also
supported the Polish position in the matter of the EaP complementariness with other
reginal initiatives and the concept of creating an EU office for EaP coordination.138
According to Slovakia, the Black Sea Synergy should concentrate on problems strictly
related to the Black Sea basin. Support fo the Eastern Partnership is also treated by
Slovakia as a manifestation of a regional “solidarity” reinforcing Slovak-Polish ties,
contributing to the deepening of regional cooperation within the EU framework and
indirectly strengthening Slovakia’s position within the EU.139 The EaP also belongs to
the sphere of “common interests” Slovakia shares with Hungary. The two countries
present a “proximate stance” in EaP matters, despite probems in their bilateral
relations.140 (MG)
Slovenia
Of all areas beyond the EU, the most important for Slovenia are the Western
Balkans. Relations with countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus do not play
a significant role in Slovenia’s foreign policy and the Eastern dimension of the ENP was
never the subject of any large scale debate in this country, the more so as the Slovenians
support the strengthening of the ENP as a whole. They hold the opinion that multilateral
cooperation with the EU’s Southern neighbours is more extensive, and that it is,
therefore, necessary to develop regional cooperation with its Eastern neighbourhood.
They also see the fundamental difference between the countries of the Southern and
Eastern neighbourhood to which the ENP is directed. The Slovenian government calls
for the recognition of the “European prospects” of at least certain EU Eastern
neighbours.
Slovenia was initially sceptical of the Eastern Partnership. In truth, the Slovenian
government gave it its formal support, but this was accompanied with more or less
openly expressed doubts concerning the potential influence of the EaP on the
functioning of other EU initiatives. The Slovenians undoubtedly had primarily the Black
Sea Synergy in mind, with which they placed great hopes, above all in connection with
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its interregional character.141 To a lesser degree these doubts concerned the potential
influence of the EaP on the financing of cooperation within the framework of the Union
for the Mediterranean. The factor that caused Slovenia’s caution in its approach to the
EaP was also the fear of Russia’s possible reaction. Slovenia feared that the Russians
could see in it an attempt to isolate them in an area that they consider their privileged
sphere of interests.
Ultimately, Slovenia joined the group of EU member countries supporting the
EaP, although the Slovenian minister of foreign affairs, Dmitrij Rupel, reiterated in
mid-2008 that the project could not be realised at the cost of cooperation with the
Southern neighbourhood of the EU, and even less at the expense of the EU’s
involvement on behalf of the membership prospects of the Western Balkans.142 The
Slovenians also drew attention to the fact that prior to the implementation of this
initiative, it will be necessary to resolve such issues as the participation of third
countries, complementarity with other regional undertakings, financing, and the
participation of Belarus.143 (RM)
Spain
The main sphere of interest of Spanish foreign policy is the Mediterranean region,
which is the origin of the most important challenges and threats to Spain’s security,
challenges connected with migrations, energy security and terrorism. Spain’s actions
within the framework of the ENP are concentrated on the development of the Southern
dimension of this policy. Spanish interest in the EaP is slight. Eastern Europe and the
South Caucasus do not occupy a significant place in the policies of this country,
although during the last few years the perception of the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood has
been changing slowly. Besides Russia, which is viewed as the most important political
and economic partner to the East of the EU, the Spaniards are beginning to notice other
countries in the region. This is especially the case for Ukraine and Moldova, from which
many immigrants to Spain come. Spanish investors also take note of Ukraine’s
economic potential.
In Spain there has practically been no debate on the Partnership. The declaration
of the Polish minister of foreign affairs about the intention to prepare an initiative for the
Eastern neighbours modelled on the Union for the Mediterranean, made during the
European Council meeting on 14 March 2008, gave rise to rather indifferent comments.
Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero only noted that in the EU there is a visible tendency to
reinforce the Eastern dimension of the ENP but, at the same time, he stated that for Spain
Mediterranean policy is the most important.144 Reaction to the proposal of EaP was
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considerably more positive, although it was limited in principle to the statement that the
initiative “has the full support” of Spain.145
According to the Spaniards, the aim of the EaP is to achieve the political and
economic stabilisation in six countries of the Eastern neighbourhood by the
establishment of close political and trade relations with them. This initiative is thus part
of the general ENP framework and under no account can it be seen as a preparatory
stage for membership.146 The Spaniards recognise, in truth, that “Ukraine is a special
case given its characteristics,” but are rather unfavourably inclined to the idea of its
membership. They argue that given Ukraine’s internal situation it is not a country that
can presently be offered the prospect of membership.147
Spain supports the participation of Belarus in the EaP. During the meeting of
ministers of foreign affairs on 16 March 2009, it supported the prolongation of the
suspension of diplomatic sanctions against that country. Foreign Minister Moratinos
also announced that Spain, as the country chairing the Council of Europe, would take
steps aimed at a rapprochement between Belarus and this institution. In connection
with this, on 30 March, the Spanish foreign minister visited Minsk.148
Although Spain declared its support for the EaP, it greeted the allocation of
additional funds for this initiative with reserve. The Spaniards consider that it is
necessary to safeguard a financial balance between the Southern and Eastern
dimensions of the ENP, which they understand as “two thirds of the funds allocated to
cooperation with Southern neighbours, and one third for cooperation with the former
Soviet republics.”149 Spain presumably fears that the additional funds for the EaP would
disturb this balance, and would perhaps even create a dangerous precedent in the
context of the approaching review of the budget in 2010 and the negotiations on the
future financial perspective.
The proposition to liberalise the visa regime also gives rise to critical opinions.150
Aaccording to the representatives of the Spanish ministry of foreign affairs, rapid
changes in this area should be ruled out, as they could have unfavourable
consequences for the internal security of EU members. Spain’s position in this respect is
influenced by the growing number of illegal immigrants from countries of Eastern
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www.es-ue.org.
147 See the pronouncement of Minister of Foreign Affairs, M.A. Moratinos Cuyaubé in DS. Cortes
Generales, Comisiones Mixtas, no. 7, 10.06.2008, s. 7, www.congreso.es.
148 The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Visits Belarus, 30.03.2009, www.coe.int.
149 Spain favoured this principle during the working out of the European Neighbourhood and
Partnership Instrument. Spain worked closely with France in this respect. 18th Franco-Spanish Summit
Statements Made by M. Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, During His Joint Press Conference
with Mr Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, President of the Government of Spain (excerpts),” Paris,
10 November 2005, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr.
150 Los titulares de Exteriores analizan hoy la situación en Oriente Próximo, Afganistán y los
Balcanes, 23.02.2009, www.europapress.es.
Europe, particularly Ukraine.151 It would seem that Spain also fears the creation of
precedents that could be used by countries of the Southern neighbourhood, where the
greatest number of immigrants to Spain come from.
The Spanish do not voice reservations about the EaP’s proposed flagship
initiatives. As a country grappling with the problem of illegal migration, Spain can, in
the future, become interested in an integrated external boundary management
programme. The project of promoting a regional energy market could also prove
attractive to Spain, the more so as Unión Fenosa, the Spanish company producing and
distributing electrical energy, possesses over 90% of shares in three of five Moldovan
distributors of electrical energy and is responsible for providing electrical power to 70%
of that country’s inhabitants.152
Spain excludes the possibility of including Russia and Turkey in the initiative on
the basis of full-fledged participants, as the EU’s policy with regard to both countries
rests on other bases than the ENP. Spain allows for their participation in Partnership
projects on a case-by-case basis.153
Spain will hold the EU presidency in the first half of 2010. One should rather not
expect any significant Spanish involvement in the development of the EaP during that
time. As the Spanish secretary of state for European affairs stated, “2009, which is a year
of Czech and Swedish presidency, is the period of the EaP. During the Spanish
presidency, which will succeed them, special attention will be paid to Mediterranean
affairs and the Union for the Mediterranean.”154 (BW)
Sweden
In the Swedish foreign policy there is an appreciation of the EU’s “soft power”
influence in the world. Sweden stresses the attraction power of the EU integration
model and the EU’s possibilities in stimulating democratic and economic change in
neighbouring areas.155 The principal motivation behind Sweden’s involvement in the
neighbourhood policy with regard to the Eastern neighbours is support for bringing
those countries closer to the EU. The countries of the Eastern neighbourhood are seen as
potential member states. The ENP is treated not as an alternative to enlargement, but as
a stage preparing neighbouring countries for possible future accession to the EU.
Before the Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership proposal was announced in May
2008, Sweden noticed shortcomings in the ENP and stressed the need to work out
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152 For more on the investments of Unión Fenosa in Moldova, see www.unionfenosa.es.
153 Press conference of Diego López Garrido, Secretary of State for EU Affairs, 23.02.2009,
www.es-ue.org.
154 Press conference of Diego López Garrido, Secretary of State for EU Affairs, 4.03.2009,
www.es-ue.org.
155 See The Address of the Swedish Minister for EU Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, Sweden in the
new Europe, The Swedish Network for European Political Science, Södertörn, 15 March 2007,
www.sweden.gov.se; Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs,
13 February 2008, www.sweden.gov.se.
a more attractive offer for the Eastern partners. Providing an additional incentive for
cooperation with the EU was considered crucial in a situation where the EU could not
offer them membership. The concept of the new cooperation framework for Eastern
neighbours was born in Poland,156 whereas Sweden decided to join this initiative given
its shared vision of relations with the Eastern neighbours, as well as the fact that
a common presentation of the proposal made for a better chance of promoting the
project within the EU.
The increase of the attractiveness of the EU offer for its Eastern neighbours and,
by the same token, the strengthening of stimuli for the continuation of democratic and
market reforms, are recognised as the main added value of the EaP. For Sweden,
especially important areas of cooperation include gradual integration with the EU
internal market, a regulatory and legal approximation with the EU and facilitations in
people mobility.157 The EaP is not a subject of lively debate in Sweden and meets with
lesser interest than in Poland.
During the presidency of Sweden in the second half of 2009, its most important
priority in terms of regional cooperation will be the Baltic Sea Strategy.158 On the subject
of the EaP, Sweden is concentrating on its implementation and does not plan any new
initiatives or meetings on a high political level. This does not mean, however, that the
EaP is loosing in significance in Swedish policy. Limiting the “high profile” of the
Partnership during its presidency of the EU, Sweden wishes to stress that this is
a common EU initiative, and not the sole domain of Poland and Sweden.
During the discussion about the EaP in February and March 2009, Sweden, as
a net contributor to the EU budget, did not fully support the Partnership financing
proposal presented by the Commission. In addition, it adopted an open stance in the
question of the participation of other countries in individual EaP projects, showing in
this way that the Partnership is not a project directed against Russia. The EU’s openness
to dialogue with Belarus and that country’s participation in the EaP is the subject of
a dispute in the governing coalition. (AK)
United Kingdom
United Kingdom was one of the initiators of EU’s policy toward its Eastern
neighbours when it and Denmark proposed, in 2002, the “New Neighbours” initiative,
which was to be directed at such countries as Moldova, Ukraine or Belarus. The
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) presently constitutes the fundamental
framework for the realisation of British interests in Eastern Europe and the Southern
Caucasus. Countries subject to the Eastern Partnership (EaP) are not, in truth, significant
economic or political partners of the UK, but its interest in this region is considerable.
Eastern Partnership: The Opening Report
Eastern
Partnership
53
156 See for example, M. Menkiszak, Enhanced European Neighbourhood Policy towards Eastern
European Partners: A Role for the Visegrád Countries?, The Foreign Policies of the Visegrad Countries
towards the Eastern Neighbourhood—Areas and Options of Cooperation, Budapest, 6th–9th December
2007, www.hiia.hu.
157 Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, op.cit.
158 F. Langdal, G. von Sydow, “The Swedish 2009 Presidency—Possible Policy Priorities,”
European Policy Analysis, no. 14, October 2008, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies,
www.sieps.se; Address of the Swedish Minister for EU Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, A Swedish Vision for
Europe, College of Europe, Brugge, 4 February 2009, www.sweden.gov.se.
This is the result of UK’s general support for steps aimed at extending the area of
stability, security and free market through further EU enlargement. The British
government points out that the ENP cannot be an alternative to or a waiting room to EU
membership. It openly favours admitting Ukraine to the EU.
The British decidedly supported the Eastern Partnership project.159 They
indicated that it is a complement to the ENP and serves to support reforms and to
strengthen security in the region, especially in the context of the Russian-Georgian war
of August 2008. They also stated that the EaP will contribute to building closer relations
with Ukraine, which is the most important EaP partner for the UK.
The UK supports association agreements (AAs), which provide for the
introduction of free trade areas and the gradual tightening of cooperation, making it
easier for partners to adopt EU norms and standards in such areas as, for example,
agricultural and manufacturing exports. With that, the British government also insists
that the adoption of EU regulations takes place at the level of multilateral cooperation. It
also holds a positive view of the introduction of a system of milestones and benchmarks
for documents that will replace present ENP action plans, as they will make the carrying
out and evaluation of reforms easier. The British authorities see the Comprehensive
Institution Building Programme as an important tool for the strengthening of
administrative and support capabilities in the implementation of obligations arising
from the AAs. In addition, the British authorities point to the necessity of increasing the
importance of long-term projects for building civil society and for mobility and reform
programs in the sectors of education and research.
The UK is positive about introducing bilateral mechanisms to reinforce energy
security. Among other things, they point to the necessity: of adopting EU regulations by
the addressees of the EaP in the sphere of energy; of adding decisions about energy
interdependence to the association agreements; of Moldova’s and Ukraine’s rapid
joining of the Energy Community Treaty; of signing memoranda on energy matters with
Moldova, Georgia and Armenia; and also of increasing support for Ukraine’s full
integration with the EU energy market.
The UK government also supported the idea of closely tying the question of the
movement of people with guarantees of a secure environment, where combating illegal
immigration, corruption and organised crime as well as border management are carried
out according to EU standards of effectiveness. The UK announced that it will be
engaged in strengthening of borders, while fully supporting initiatives directed at
combating illegal migration, including the so-called Mobility Partnership. Its approach
to the questions of visa regulations and the movement of people is cautious. It is not
inclined to conclude understandings about opening the EU labour market for EaP
partners. Moreover, it is against their inclusion in the Cohesion Policy, which,
according to the UK, should apply only to EU member states.
With regard to the initiative financing, the British government pointed out that
considerable additional funds within the framework of present and future financial
perspectives are necessary in order to fully use the EaP potential. At the same time, the
British government drew attention to the already excessive pressure being put on the
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159 SeeD.Miliband,Ukraine, Russia andEuropeanSecurity, Kiev, 27.08.2008,www.davidmiliband.info;
C. Flint, Written Ministerial Statements, FCO, Prospects for the European Union in 2009, 27.02.2009,
Column 14WS, www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com.
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, given the shifting of funds that
took place in connection with the August 2008 war in Georgia and support of the
Palestinian Autonomy. It also indicated that an appropriate balancing of needs,
expectations and present initiatives directed at the EU’s Southern neighbours will be
necessary.160 The UK seems less inclined to treat the matter of ENP financing as
a priority issue. It traditionally views any increase of EU budget expenditures, also for
the neighbourhood policy, unfavourably.161 In the UK, opinions are being voiced that
the EaP only has a chance of reaching its aims in the longer perspective, on the
condition that both the EU and partner countries are adequately involved in it.
Difficulties that are encountered in carrying out the Barcelona Process and which may
also arise in the EU’s relations with its Eastern neighbours are also being mentioned in
this context.162 In light of this, cooperation within the framework of the EaP should be
adapted to each individual partner and cannot be treated as a road to EU membership or
as an “eternal waiting room” for EU admission.163
The UK supports the EU’s opening towards Belarus and calls for that country’s
participation in the EaP. The government expects that cooperation could mobilise the
Belarusian authorities to introduce further reforms at home.164 It also views positively
the possibility of third countries’ participation in EaP projects. In this context, the UK
takes Russia’s reaction under account and thinks that, on the one hand, the aims and the
realisation of the Eastern Partnership should be openly communicated to it while,, on
the other, Russia should be involved in projects that will allow for a more effective
resolution of problems in the common neighbourhood—especially in the spheres of
security and energy. (BZ)
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160 European Scrutiny Committee, The EU Eastern Partnership, Report 2, Document 7, House of
Commons, 17.12.2008, www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com.
161 See A. Mayhew, “The British Position in the Negotiation of the Financial Network,” Working
Paper FG 1, SWP Berlin, 2005/07, July 2005, www.swp-berlin.org.
162 European Scrutiny Committee, The EU…, op.cit.
163 See D. Miliband, Developments in the European Union, Minutes of Evidence, HC 79-i,
10.12.2008, answers to questions 44 and 45, www.publications.parliament.uk.
164 See Ibidem, answers to questions 48 and 49.

Chapter II
ENP Eastern Dimension Countries
on Eastern Partnership

Armenia
The authorities of Armenia consider the Western model of development to be the
most appropriate, and integration with the EU is treated as a “strategic choice.” Even
though they do not openly articulate the postulate of EU membership, such is the desire
of a considerable segment of the political elite, of the absolute majority of citizens, and
also of the strong Armenian diaspora in Western countries.165 In practice, however, it is
considered the only pro-Russian country of the South Caucasus, and not without reason.
Armenia is tied to Russia by a political and military alliance, and its economy is
controlled by Russian entities. Such a state of affairs results primarily from Armenia’s
location, bordering on an ill-disposed Turkey and on Azerbaijan, with which it is in
a state of war over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Armenia participates in the implementation of the European Neighbourhood
Policy and has a positive view of the EaP.166 The absence of a wider debate about the EU
initiative is visible, however. In assessing the EaP and the ENP, the Armenian authorities
consider that they create a greater chance for increasing their country’s integration with
the EU, that it represents an opportunity to obtain additional funds for modernisation
and gives hope that the EU will pay greater attention to the region of the Caucasus. In
their relations with the EU, the Armenian authorities are interested in the liberalisation
of the visa system and the establishment of a free trade area. They also praise the fact that
the EaP can serve to develop regional cooperation. Armenia is counting on the EU’s
support in its political and historical disputes with Turkey.167
Armenia attaches great importance to the sphere of security, seeing the EaP as an
instrument making it possible to stabilise the situation in the South Caucasus,
particularly to reduce the danger of renewed fighting with Azerbaijan. President Serzh
Sargsyan expressed the hope that the EU will make efforts to ensure that the premises of
the program are respected by all countries participating in the initiative.168 The deputy
minister of foreign affairs, Arman Kirakosyan, stated that the EaP could contribute to
reducing tensions and resolve conflicts in the region.169 (£A, RŒ)
Azerbaijan
In 2004, President Ilham Aliyev stressed that Azerbaijan identifies entirely with
European values and treats integration with the EU as a “strategic choice.”170 In practice,
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166 Joint Statement by President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barosso, and President
of the Republic of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, Yerevan, 7 November 2008, www.delarm.ec.europa.eu;
Foreign Minister of Armenia Meets with the European Commissioner for External Relations and European
Neighbourhood Policy, 19.01.2009, www.armeniaforeignministry.com.
167 See ForeignMinister of Armenia Edward Nalbandian Starts Official Visit to Poland, 17.02.2009,
www.armeniaforeignministry.com; ÅÑ ïðèâíîñèò â ðåãèîí íå êîíêóðåíöèþ, à ñîòðóäíè÷åñòâî
– çàììèíèñòðà èíîñòðàííûõ äåë Àðìåíèè, 23.01.2009, http://hayinfo.ru.
168 President Serzh Sargsyan Received the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus,
Peter Semneby, 18.02.2009, www.president.am.
169 Interview with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Arman Kirakosyan, Mediamax
Agency, 23.01.2008; www.armeniaforeignministry.com.
170 President Ilham Aliyev Spoke during the PACE Spring Session Meeting, 29.04.2004,
http://president.az.
however, this aim remains a declarative one. This is the result not only of geographical
and cultural distance from Europe, but also of the authoritarianism that reigns in this
country. In addition, Azerbaijan is not encouraged by the example of Turkey, a country
that is close culturally and politically and whose efforts over many years to gain
membership in the EU have thus far not produced the expected results.
Azerbaijan declares a favourable attitude towards the idea of the EaP.171
Summing up the year 2008, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the EaP
as an additional impulse to strengthen cooperation with the EU by way of new
association agreements.172 The minister of foreign affairs, Elmar Mammadyarov,
recognised three baskets as having priority for Azerbaijan within the framework of the
EaP: security (the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the struggle against terrorism),
economic matters (transit, energy security, economic cooperation beyond the energy
sector), people-to-people contacts (liberalisation of the visa system, student exchanges,
scientific and legal cooperation).173 In truth, Azerbaijan’s lack of WTO membership
makes it impossible to initiate negotiations about the free trade area with the EU, but the
authorities have declared their interest in an association agreement with the EU, in
cooperating in such areas as the fiscal and customs system and in the creation of
convenient conditions for the development of business and fighting corruption.174 They
do not show, however, any interest in reforms leading to greater democratisation and
the rule of law.
Most Azerbaijani experts hold a positive view of the EaP. They stress that this
initiative will lead to the strengthening of economic and political ties with the EU, and
the Azerbaijani elites will be under a greater influence of “European thinking.”175
Economic cooperation will make the Azerbaijani economy less dependent on the
energy sector, more modern and competitive. It is thought that the EaP could become
a platform for accelerated integration with the EU,176 and also for the gradual integration
with the Euro-Atlantic security area.177
Certain experts also think that the project has an anti-Russian edge and that it is
an attempt to punish Russia for the war in Georgia by wresting Belarus and Armenia
away from it, that it constitutes a strategic counterweight for Russia’s actions, and that it
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release, 9.12.2008, www.consilium.europa.eu.
172 ÌÈÄ Àçåðáàéäæàíà ðàñïðîñòðàíèë îò÷åò ïî èòîãàì 2008 ãîäà, 13.01.2009,
www.newsazerbaijan.ru.
173 Â ðàìêàõ “Âîñòî÷íîãî ïàðòíåðñòâà” ïðèîðèòåòíûìè äëÿ Àçåðáàéäæàíà áóäóò âîïðîñû
áåçîïàñíîñòè, ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî è ãóìàíèòàðíîãî ñîòðóäíè÷åñòâà – ãëàâà ÌÈÄ Àçåðáàéäæàíà,
27.02.2009, http://hayinfo.ru.
174 Àçåðáàéäæàí âñêîðå âûñêàæåò ñâîå ìíåíèå ÅÑ î âêëþ÷åíèè â ïðîãðàììó “Âîñòî÷íîå
ïàðòíåðñòâî” – çàììèíèñòðà, 20.02.2009, www.newsazerbaijan.ru.
175 Ãåîïîëèòè÷åñêèå ïîòðÿñåíèÿ ìîãóò îêàçàòü ðåøàþùåå âëèÿíèå íà ñèòóàöèþ â Àçåð-
áàéäæàíå—Ðàñèì Àãàåâ, 26.02.2009, www.newsazerbaijan.ru.
176 Ñ. Ðçàåâ, Í. Àáàñîâ, Âîñòî÷íîå ïàðòíåðñòâî Åâðîïåéñêîãî ñîþçà îòêðûâàåò íîâûå
âîçìîæíîñòè ïåðåä ïÿòüþ áûâøèìè ðåñïóáëèêàìè Ñîâåòñêîãî Ñîþçà, 27.06.2008, http://azeri.ppd.spb.ru;
“Âîñòî÷íîå ïàðòíåðñòâî” äàåò øèðîêèå âîçìîæíîñòè äëÿ èíòåãðàöèè â ÅÑ, íî ñàì ïðîöåññ çàâèñèò
îò äåéñòâèé ñòðàíû—ïîëèòîëîã, 4.12.2008, www.newsazerbaijan.ru.
177 Ïðèñîåäèíåíèå Áàêó ê ïðîãðàììå ÅÑ “Âîñòî÷íîå ïàðòíåðñòâî” – øàã ê ñèñòåìå
åâðîïåéñêîé áåçîïàñíîñòè—ïîëèòîëîã, 4.12.2008, www.newsazerbaijan.ru.
is not as vitally important for Azerbaijan, which has no need for economic assistance, as
do some of its other addressees.178 (£A, RŒ)
Belarus
The relations between Belarus and the EU were already tense in the 1990s. This
was directly attributable to President Alaksandr Lukashenka’s building of an
authoritarian regime that broke human rights and violated civic liberties. In truth, the EU
signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Belarus in 1995, but suspended
the ratification of this document after Lukashenka dissolved parliament, extended his
term, and expanded presidential powers in 1996. In addition, Belarus was not included
in the ENP. In 2004, following a falsified referendum annulling limitations on the
number of presidential terms, the EU introduced visa sanctions for several
representatives of the regime. These were extended in 2006 following the brutal
repression of the opposition during the Belarusian presidential electoral campaign and
immediately following it.
Possibilities to improve mutual relations emerged in 2008. Growing economic
difficulties and fears of excessive economic and political dependence on Russia,
especially following the Georgia-Russia war of August 2008, forced the regime to seek
ways to attract Western investments. The EU, in turn, saw that the policy of isolating the
Belarusian authorities did not produce the expected results, i.e. it did not lead the
regime to liberalise.
During work on the EaP, which coincided with signs of liberalisation in Belarus,
the EU conducted consultations with the authorities in Minsk. They were interested in
the EU initiative from the beginning, although they tried not to let this show.
Pronouncements from Belarusian diplomats and from Lukashenka himself seem to
indicate that Minsk is counting on the EU’s acceptance of the system of government in
place in Belarus, on an end to the diplomatic isolation, on the intensification of
economic cooperation, on assistance from the EU to improve economic and
environmental standards, on aid of a technical and consulting character, and on the
liberalisation of the visa regime.179 Such an interpretation is suggested by, for example,
the official commentary of the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs following the
adoption of the Partnership by the European Council. It stated that given the very
general shape of the initiative, it is difficult to comment on it, though Belarus is
interested in expanding all forms of cooperation with the EU in all formats that
presuppose the equal participation of the Belarusian state and its representatives
without any preliminary conditions.”180
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Îòâåòû ïðåññ-ñåêðåòàðÿ ÌÈÄ Àíäðåÿ Ïîïîâà íà âîïðîñû ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé ñðåäñòâ ìàññîâîé èíôîð-
ìàöèè â õîäå áðèôèíãà â ÌÈÄ Áåëàðóñè 6 íîÿáðÿ 2008 ãîäà, www.mfa.gov.by.
180 See Êîììåíòàðèé ïðåññ-ñåêðåòàðÿ ÌÈÄ Àíäðåÿ Ïîïîâà â ñâÿçè ñ âîïðîñîì àãåíòñòâà
“ÁåëàÏÀÍ” î ïîçèöèè áåëîðóññêîé ñòîðîíû îòíîñèòåëüíî ïîëüñêî-øâåäñêîãî ïðåäëîæåíèÿ î ôîð-
ìèðîâàíèè “Âîñòî÷íîãî ïàðòíåðñòâà,” www.mfa.gov.by.
Following the EU summit in December 2008, the Belarusian authorities
confirmed their readiness to collaborate with the EU within the framework of the EaP.
They mentioned cooperation in spheres such as trade, energy, transport, fighting
cross-border crime, the environment and agriculture, in which Belarus would be
particularly interested. They also declared that many proposals of cooperation
negotiated between the EU and Belarus within the framework of the EaP could also be
realised in a multilateral format.181
From that time, Minister Martynau pronounced himself publicly about the EaP
and he went into detail about his Ministry’s position on many occasions. He generally
assessed the project positively, appreciating that the EU had consulted it with Belarus,
though he stated that his country’s final position on the matter would depend on the
final shape of the program.182 In an interview given to Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
he did not even rule out that in the longer term, Belarus could become a member of the
EU and NATO, though he pointed out that there are no such plans in the foreseeable
future.183 He stressed firmly that for Belarus it is a matter of principle that the Partnership
rest on a mechanism of equality for all of its participants,”184 and also gave assurances
that Belarus does not lay claim to either economic assistance on a great scale or
preferences and abatements. To the spheres of cooperation mentioned in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs communiqué in December, Martynau added customs cooperation,
fighting illegal migration, and facilitations in the transport of merchandise.185 He also
strongly emphasised that for Belarus the improvement in the quality of production and
the introduction of standards similar or identical to those in force in the EU is very
important. He expressed the hope that Belarus will be able to take advantage of the
finance and credit institutions that are presently inaccessible to it, such as the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank.186
Lukashenka himself made a pronouncement on the EaP. In an interview given to
the Euronews station, he stated that Belarus welcomes this positive gesture of Europe
towards its neighbours. This is a very pragmatic and reasonable step, which is topical
from the point of view of the European Union. For this reason, we view positively the
Eastern Partnership initiative.”187 He also added that the most important question is not
who will represent Belarus at the May 2009 EU summit devoted to this initiative. In
addition, Lukashenka personally spoke to the president of Ukraine, Victor Yushchenko,
about the realisation of common undertakings within the framework of the EaP—mainly
infrastructural projects, such as the express highway from Kaliningrad, Vilnius, Minsk
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182 See Ñòåíîãðàììà ïîäõîäà ê ïðåññå Ìèíèñòðà èíîñòðàííûõ äåë Ðåñïóáëèêè Áåëàðóñü
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Âèãàóäàñîì Óøàöêàñîì, ñîñòîÿâøåéñÿ 29 äåêàáðÿ 2008 ãîäà â ÌÈÄ Áåëàðóñè, www.mfa.gov.by.
183 See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 14 February 2009. Lukashenka himself spoke similarly
about the prospects for relations between Belarus and the EU and NATO, see Èíòåðâüþ
èíôîðìàöèîííîìó àãåíòñòâó ”Ôðàíñ-Ïðåññ,” op.cit.
184 Bielta Agance press release, 17.03.2009.
185 Ibidem.
186 Èíòåðâüþ Ìèíèñòðà èíîñòðàííûõ äåë Ðåñïóáëèêè Áåëàðóñü Ñåðãåÿ Ìàðòûíîâà Ïåðâîìó
íàöèîíàëüíîìó òåëåêàíàëó (Ìèíñê, 5 ôåâðàëÿ 2009 ãîäà), http://mfa.gov.by.
187 Ñòåíîãðàììà èíòåðâüþ Ïðåçèäåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Áåëàðóñü À.Ã. Ëóêàøåíêî òåëåêàíàëó
“Åâðîíüþñ” (2 ôåâðàëÿ 2009 ãîäà), www.president.gov.by.
and Kyiv to the ports of the Black Sea (such as Illichivsk or Mykolaiv) and cooperation in
the sphere of energy.188
Generally, one can say that Belarusian authorities support the Eastern
Partnership, counting that thanks to it Belarus will reap tangible economic benefits and
receive assistance in the modernisation of its infrastructure and technology. At the same
time, Belarus demands to be treated as an “equal” partner, which is a demand for the de
facto acceptance of the system of government present in the country and for the lifting of
the diplomatic isolation.
Participation in the EaP will undoubtedly be perceived by the Belarus authorities
as a form of legitimation of their regime. This is also one of the principal reasons why the
Belarusian opposition is divided about the EaP. A considerable portion of the
opposition views it with reserve, while some of its activists criticise it openly.
The political council of the liberal United Civic Party—one of the major
Belarusian opposition parties—adopted a resolution to the effect that Belarus should be
included in the Partnership but only provided that the authorities meet all conditions
that are essential for the country to be able to take part in in.”189 The context of this rather
unclear statement suggests that it refers to the demands made of Belarus by the EU in the
sphere of democratisation, and which were to be found in the European Commission
work document from November 2006.190 As party leader Anatoly Lebedko later
explained: “Peaceful demonstrations are being dispersed, new political prisoners have
appeared. I think that in this situation, including our country in this program will lead to
massive disappointment precisely among the pro-European Belarusians. One cannot
say, on the one hand, that yesterday Belarus was the ’last dictatorship in Europe’ and, on
the other, include it today in European programs without a qualitative improvement of
the situation in Belarus.”191 Lebedko is also firmly against the visit of European
politicians to Minsk and the invitation of Lukashenka to the EU summit.192
The BNF Party (the old Belarusian People’s Front and one of the strongest
opposition groups), which clearly supports its country’s membership in the EU and in
NATO, uses a similar argumentation. In a special resolution, the party declared its
support for Belarus’ participation in the Eastern Partnership, but only on the condition of
the prior democratisation of the country. In practice, this proposal entails that Belarus be
included in the EaP, but that its participation in specific projects be suspended
immediately afterwards. “Presently, when the authorities are interested in European
assistance, one cannot open the door to them without insisting on the liberation of all
political prisoners, on respect for freedom of speech and assembly, on changes to the
electoral law and, lastly, on free elections. Cooperation with Belarus within the
framework of the program has to proceed step by step and be made conditional on the
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188 See Communiqué of the press service of the President of Ukraine of 20 January 2009:
Íàéáëèæ÷èì ÷àñîì Óêðà¿íà ïëàíóº â³äíîâèòè ïîñòàâêè åëåêòðîåíåðã³¿ äî Á³ëîðóñ³ and also Èíòåðâüþ
Ìèíèñòðà èíîñòðàííûõ äåë Ðåñïóáëèêè Áåëàðóñü…, op.cit.
189 Declaration of the Political Council of the United Civic Party of 26 February 2009: “Âîñòî÷íîå
ïàðòíåðñòâî” – ïîêà íå äëÿ Áåëàðóñè, www.ucpb.org.
190 See the document of the European Commission from November 2006: What the European
Union Could Bring to Belarus, http://ec.europa.eu.
191 Ñ. Ïóëüøà, “Âîñòî÷íîå ïàðòíåðñòâî”: Áåëàðóñü âêëþ÷àò, îïïîçèöèþ èñêëþ÷àò?,
24.02.2009, http://naviny.by.
192 See the PAP press release of 10 March 2009.
performance by its leaders of specific steps in the direction of democratisation.”193
Understandably, the party is firmly opposed to the invitation of Lukashenka to the EU
summit.
Both parties, especially the BNF, criticised the EU’s annulment of its sanctions
against officials of the regime as early as October 2008. The Social-Democrat Stanislau
Shushkevitch, a former speaker of the Supreme Council and head of state in the years
1991–1994, even suggested that the EU’s policy is amoral.”194 In turn, Alaksandr
Kazulin, Lukashenka’s opponent in the 2006 presidential elections, following which he
was imprisoned for two and a half years, said that “accepting Lukashenka into the
program will unquestionably signify the confirmation of the European program of
support for the Lukashenka regime.”195 He also criticised the Partnership if it were to be
directed against Russia,196 although he admitted that the program itself is beneficial for
his country.197 At the same time, he also accused Poland of making immoral deals with
Lukashenka and disregarding European values in exchange for improved conditions for
the Polish minority in Belarus.198
Many known political analysts, most of whom support the opposition, are
proponents of Belarus’ participation in the EaP, even without a significant “thaw.”199
This is also the position of Alaksandr Milinkevitch, a former opposition presidential
candidate in 2006 and presently one of the most visible anti-Lukashenka figures in
Belarus. The leader of the moment “For Liberty” has for a long time also called for the
annulment of trade sanctions and for dialogue with the authorities for the purpose of
liberalising the regime and modernising the economy and in order to prevent Belarus’
loss of its sovereignty. Milinkevitch claims that the inclusion of Belarus into the EaP
would not be an inclusion of the authorities but an inclusion of the Belarusian people
and would constitute a “historical decision” that would “confirm Belarus’ choice to be
in Europe.” He also claims that including Belarus in this initiative would push the
authorities toward democratisation, favour the modernisation of the economy and help
counterbalance Russia’s influence in Belarus.200 (£A)
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193 Declaration of the BNF party of 14 March 2009: Çàÿâà Ñîéìó Ïàðòû³ ÁÍÔ ÂÀ “¡ñõîäí³ì
ïàðòíýðñòâå” ïàâ³ííà áûöü äýìàêðàòû÷íàÿ áåëàðóñü, http://pbnf.org.
194 Ñ. Ïóëüøà, Íè îäíî èç 12 óñëîâèé Åâðîñîþçà íå âûïîëíåíî, ñ÷èòàåò Ñòàíèñëàâ
Øóøêåâè÷, 24.02.2009, http://belapan.com.
195 Interview of A. Kazulin and A. Labedka for the portal Delfi on 14 March 2009: Áåëîðóññêàÿ
îïïîçèöèÿ: Åâðîïà çàáûâàåò î äåìîêðàòè÷åñêèõ öåííîñòÿõ, http://ru.delfi.lt.
196 Ibidem.
197 15 ëåò äèêòàòóðû íèêóäà íå óøëè, 20.03.2009, www.charter97.org.
198 PAP press release of 10 March 2009.
199 See Ýêñïåðòû: Äûÿëîã òðýáà ïðàöÿãâàö, 19.03.2009, http://by.milinkevich.org. Belarus’
participation in the Eastern Partnership is supported by Valery Karbalevich, Vitali Silitski, Andrey
Liakhovich, Dzianis Meliantsou. It is also favoured by Uladzimir Ulakhovich (in a conversation with the
author).
200 Ì³ë³íêåâ³÷: Äàëó÷ýííå äà ïðàãðàìû “Óñõîäíÿå ïàðòí¸ðñòâà” ïàñïðûÿå äýìàêðàòûçàöû³,
24.02.2009, http://by.milinkevich.org.
Georgia
Of the countries of the South Caucasus, Georgia is not only located closest to
Europe in geographical terms, but is also a country that has for many years been firmly
calling for integration with Western structures—NATO and the EU. Such integration is
favoured by Georgia’s sense of cultural and religious affinity with Europe as well as the
state of Russian-Georgian relations. Since Micheil Saakashvili became president in
2003, Georgia’s foreign policy took on a clearly pro-Western orientation. Since Russia’s
invasion of Georgia in August 2008, the two countries have severed diplomatic ties.
Georgia—similarly to Armenia and Azerbaijan—was included in the European
Neighbourhood Policy in 2004. The initial version of the EU assistance program did not
provide for the participation of South Caucasian countries. Many EU members
considered that countries of this region were too remote from the EU, too unstable, or
too closely tied with Russia for them to be included in the policy addressed to the EU’s
neighbours. The EU changed its mind only after the democratic “Revolution of the
Roses” in Georgia in 2003. Geostrategic considerations also played an important role.
Through the Black Sea, Georgia neighbours on Bulgaria and Romania, which became
EU members in 2007. Georgia is also an important transit country—for example, the
exploitation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline began in 2006.
Georgia sees the ENP as an appropriate step toward EU integration. It expects
primarily the liberalisation of the visa system, the removal of trade barriers and the
establishment of a free trade area, and increased EU involvement in conflict resolution
in the Caucasus. Such are also its basic expectations from the Eastern Partnership.
Georgia took a positive view of this initiative,201 although very little is being said about
it. For the authorities, the priority areas in the EaP are security issues, including energy
security, and transit (new transit routes) and transport (new rail lines) of resources.
Georgia is also planning to present common initiatives with Azerbaijan and
Ukraine—its GUAM allies. Of course, the reconstruction of the country following the
destruction during the war and greater EU involvement in the area, including support of
Georgia’s efforts to restore the territorial integrity of the country, are also unusually
important. Lastly, Georgia is hoping for financial assistance, including funds for fighting
the effects of the world economic crisis and the improvement of conditions for the
functioning of Georgian companies. The latter demand is related to the
already-mentioned Georgian “traditional” demands from the EU, the creation of a free
trade area and the liberalisation of the visa regime. Responding to the decision of the
Council of Europe of 19–20 March 2009, Saakashvili talked of the need to build the
Nabucco pipeline, something that would considerably increase Georgia’s strategic
significance, and expressed the hope for an influx of foreign investments.202 (£A, RŒ)
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201 See Ìèõàèë Ñààêàøâèëè: “Ñêîðî Ãðóçèÿ âìåñòå ñ åùå ïÿòüþ ãîñóäàðñòâàìè ñìîæåò
ñîçäàòü íîâîå âîñòî÷íîå ïàðòíåðñòâî ñ Åâðîïîé,” 21.01.2009, http://day.az; A weekly briefing at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 2.03.2009, www.mfa.gov.ge; Ïðèîðèòåòû â ðàìêàõ “Âîñòî÷íîãî
ïàðòíåðñòâà” äëÿ Ãðóçèè – âîïðîñû áåçîïàñíîñòè, 27.02.2009, www.panarmenian.net; The Report of
Open Society Georgia and an NGO Group, For Transparency of Public Finances: Georgia and the
European Neighbourhood Policy. Perspectives and Challenges, www.osgf.ge.
202
Ñààêàøâèëè äîâîëåí ïîäêëþ÷åíèåì Ãðóçèè ê ïðîãðàììå ÅÑ “Âîñòî÷íîå ïàðòíåðñòâî,”
21.03.2009, www.interfax.ru.
Moldova
Culturally and historically tied to Romania, Moldova expressed its aspirations for
EU membership as early as 1996. Following initial hesitations, this position was
maintained by the governments of the communist party which gained power in 2001.
The communists, with President Vladimir Voronin at the fore, treat relations with the EU
in a very instrumental fashion—as an opportunity gain access to EU funds and to
assistance in the reunification of the country, whose eastern portion, Transnistria, is
ruled by Moscow-backed separatists.
Moldova has been participating in the implementation of the ENP since its very
beginnings and its participation in the EaP seemed a matter of course. For this reason,
the little enthusiasm shown by the Moldovan authorities for this project may have come
as some surprise to the EU. In July 2008, Andrei Stratan, Moldovan minister of foreign
affairs, while thanking Poland for its support for Moldova’s integration efforts, including
explicite—for the EaP project, nevertheless pointed out that his country needed clear
European prospects.203 Moldovan Prime Minister Zinaida Greceani, during a meeting
with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, assessed the EaP positively and assured Tusk
that Moldova will gladly participate in it.204 In September of the same year, president
Voronin said that, of all EaP aspects, Moldova is mostly interested in the building of
a deeper free trade area with the EU, the mobility of labour and the “roadmap” on
liberalising the visa regime.205 In January 2009 in turn, he gave assurances that
“Moldova’s European choice is irreversible.”206 At the same time, the Moldovan
authorities neither commented on the work of the EaP in any way, nor did they put
forward any proposals of their own.
Voronin’s negative pronouncement about the EaP in February 2009 caused a stir.
The president stated that “it reminded him of CIS-2,” only a “controlled one,” and one
that forms a “ring around Russia.” He criticised the financial assistance provided by the
program, calling it “candy given out on such occasions.” He expressed dissatisfaction
that Moldova was placed in the same basket as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,207
countries far less advanced in European integration than Moldova, in his opinion.
It is difficult not to view this sharp pronouncement in the context of
Moldovan-Russian relations. Russia treats the EaP in geopolitical terms, as an instrument
by which the EU expands its “sphere of influence,” something that the Russian foreign
minister, Sergei Lavrov, expressed publicly on 21 March 2009. As it happened,
Voronin’s critique was spoken a few days following the Russian politician’s visit to
Kishinev, and three weeks before Moldovan president’s meeting in Moscow on
18 March 2009 with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and the leader of the
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203 See Meeting of Andrei Stratan and Radoslaw Sikorski, 11.07.2008, www.mfa.gov.md.
204 Moldovan Premier Meets Polish Foreign Minister, 11.07.2008, www.gov.md.
205 Preºedintele Republicii Moldova, Vladimir Voronin, a prezidat ªedinþa Comisiei Naþionale
pentru Integrare Europeanã, 26 Septembrie 2008, www.presedinte.md.
206 Alocuþiunea Domnului Vladimir Voronin, Preºedintele Republicii Moldova, în cadrul recepþiei
oferite Corpului diplomatic ºi participanþilor la Reuniunea SEECP, 29 Ianuarie 2009, www.prezident.md.
207 See the PAP press release of 27 February 2009.
Transnistrian separatists, Igor Smirnov. This was a sign of Moscow’s efforts to resolve the
Transnistrian conflict as quickly as possible in keeping with its strategic interests.208
Despite this criticism, one can expect that Moldova will join the EU initiative.
Given the public’s pro-European views, a decision not to participate in the program
would be very badly received by the people. In addition, it would deprive Moldova of
an opportunity to obtain EU funds and assistance in the promotion of Moldovan exports
on EU markets (wines). It would also considerably worsen relations with the EU and
make the country unilaterally dependent on Russia, something that is not in the interest
of the Moldovan authorities. (£A)
Ukraine
Ukraine is the largest of the countries to which the Eastern Partnership is
addressed. Of all the inhabitants of the six countries included in this initiative, three out
of five are Ukrainians and Ukraine produces 58% of the region’s total GDP. Ukrainian
authorities wish for their country to become an EU member and expect the EU to
provide wide-scale assistance in its integration process and to recognise its “European
Perspective.”
After the announcement of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004,
Ukraine viewed this initiative with coolness and distrust. Although it did not refuse to
participate in it, Ukraine claimed that the ENP does not appreciate Ukraine’s European
identity or its ambitions to join the EU and treats it on the same basis as countries of
North Africa, which are remote from the EU on account of culture and whose
geographical situation rules out EU membership. The Eastern Partnership was greeted
positively in Ukraine in large measure precisely because it singles out the “European
neighbours of the EU”—six post-Soviet countries located in a politically defined Europe,
of which some openly express a desire to join the EU—from other participants in the
ENP—Europe’s neighbours. The program also gives hope for a real acceleration of
Ukraine’s integration with the EU and for its reaching of EU standards.
The same day that the EaP was presented for the first time during the meeting of
EU foreign ministers, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in an official
commentary, greeted this initiative with satisfaction, but stated that the proposed
program is indicative of the need for the EU to work out an effective Eastern dimension
providing for clear EU membership prospects to its “European neighbours.”209 A month
later, after the EaP had been approved by the European Council, the Ukrainian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs pointed out that the practical realisation of the EaP should reflect the
specificity of each partner country and take into account the state of its democracy, its
economy, and the declared ultimate aim of relations with the EU. At the same time, it
was hoped that the aim of the program would not be to preclude in an elegant manner
Ukraine’s prospects of EU membership.210
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208 See Kommiersant of 19 March 2009.
209 Êîìåíòàð Ïðåñ-ñëóæáè ÌÇÑ Óêðà¿íè ùîäî ðîçðîáêè ñõ³äíîãî âèì³ðó ïîë³òèêè
ªâðîïåéñüêîãî Ñîþçó, 26.05.2008, www.mfa.gov.ua.
210 Êîìåíòàð Ïðåñ-ñëóæáè ÌÇÑ Óêðà¿íè ùîäî ðåçóëüòàò³â ðîçãëÿäó íà çàñ³äàíí³ ªâðî-
ïåéñüêî¿ Ðàäè íîâî¿ êîíöåïö³¿ â³äíîñèí ªÑ ç³ ñõ³äíèìè ïàðòíåðàìè, 24.06.2008, www.mfa.gov.ua.
On 3 December 2008, when the European Commission announced its proposal
about the EaP, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted with satisfaction that the
“level of ambition of the framework of the Eastern Partnership for each partner country
will depend on the efforts, aims and abilities of each of them.”211 At the same time, it
also clearly declared that Ukraine will only cooperate in the EaP if the program does not
constitute an alternative to future EU membership, but will bring [Ukraine] closer to that
goal.”212 Generally speaking, Ukraine cannot get rid of a certain distrust with regard to
this initiative out of fear that some Western European politicians see the EaP not as
a stage on the way to EU membership but as a substitute for it.
Following the Ministry’s lead, commentaries on the EaP began to be voiced by
politicians. Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko appraised the project positively.213 She
also stated that it creates an additional opportunity on the way to EU integration for
Ukraine.214 President Yushchenko, who has recently been continuously at odds with
Prime Minister Tymoshenko, recognised the Polish-Swedish initiative as an “excellent”
thing.215 He noted with satisfaction that the EaP recognises the European identity of the
EU’s Eastern neighbours. In doing so, he also voiced the hope that a free trade area
would also be established and that the visa regime would be liberalised.216
Borys Tarasyuk, a two-time minister of foreign affairs and presently the chairman
of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Commission for European Affairs, also spoke positively
of the EaP. According to him, it is one more instrument for the realisation of the
Ukrainian strategy for European integration, although a greater scale in its realisation
would be desirable. He announced that Ukraine was ready to collaborate within the
framework “Euronest”—the parliamentary dimension of the Partnership.217
The subject of the EaP was most often raised by Hryhoriy Nemyria, deputy prime
minister responsible for European integration. His pronouncements indicate that
Ukraine expects from the EU assistance programs for raising the effectiveness of the
Ukrainian administration; support for regions, especially the ones that are distrustful of
the idea of Ukrainian integration with the EU (the Crimea and the Donbas); support for
Ukrainian agriculture; the expansion of cooperation in the sphere of security;
guaranteeing the appropriate financing of aid programs; intensification of cooperation
with the EU in the sphere of energy, including issues related to the transit of gas to the
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211 Êîìåíòàð ÌÇÑ Óêðà¿íè ùîäî Êîìóí³êàö³¿ ªâðîïåéñüêî¿ Êîì³ñ³¿ “Ñõ³äíå ïàðòíåðñòâî” â³ä 3
ãðóäíÿ 2008 ðîêó, 4.12.2008, www.mfa.gov.ua.
212 Ibidem.
213 See Ãëàâè óðÿä³â Óêðà¿íè òà Ïîëüù³ äîìîâèëèñÿ ïðî ïðèøâèäøåííÿ ðåàë³çàö³¿ äâîñòî-
ðîííüî¿ Óãîäè ùîäî ìàëîãî ïðèêîðäîííîãî ðóõó, 14.07.2008, www.kmu.gov.ua.
214 See UNIAN press release of 14 July 2008. Timoshenko also has hope that the Eastern
Partnership will favour the EU’s recognition of Ukraine’s EU membership prospects. See UNIAN press
release of 21 November 2008.
215 Çàÿâè Ïðåçèäåíòà Óêðà¿íè òà Êîðîëÿ Øâåö³¿ çà ï³äñóìêàìè çóñòð³÷³, 30.09.2008,
www.president.gov.ua; Ïðåçèäåíò Óêðà¿íè òà Êîðîëü Øâåö³¿ ç äðóæèíàìè â³äâ³äàëè Íàö³îíàëüíèé
çàïîâ³äíèê “Ñîô³ÿ Êè¿âñüêà,” 30.09.2008, www.president.gov.ua.
216 See the Ukrainian version of the interview given by Viktor Yushchenko for the daily Lietuvos
inios on 9 December 2008; Á³ëüøå í³æ ñòðàòåã³÷íèé ïàðòíåð, www.president.gov.ua.
217 See the Ukrinform press release of 25 February 2009; “²í³ö³àòèâà ‘Ñõ³äíå ïàðòíåðñòâî’ –
äîäàíà âàðò³ñòü, ÷è ëèøå çì³íà äåêîðàö³é?,” 27.02.2009, http://comeuroint.rada.gov.ua.
EU, nuclear energy and the modernisation of Ukraine’s network of gas pipelines.218 The
Ukrainian authorities also expect technical assistance for the implementation of EU
standards in agriculture and industry, investments in the development of transport and
agricultural infrastructure and the strengthening of industrial cooperation.
Following the March summit of the European Council, Ukrainian diplomats
noted with regret that the promise of annulling visas in the long term, which was to be
found in the European Commission’s proposal, had been replaced by its
“liberalisation,” while the entirety of the EaP was less ambitious on the whole.219 The
assistant chief of staff of Ukraine’s president, Andriy Hancharyk, in presenting
Yushchenko’s position, assesses many elements of the EaP positively, including the
announcement of the creation of a program for the increase of the quality of
administration and border management or cooperation in the sphere of energy. He
expressed dissatisfaction, however, that, instead of economic integration and political
association that were proposed in the document of the Commission, the Council
decided to ”create conditions toward this end,” and instead of annulling the visa system,
it limited itself to announcing its liberalisation.220
The attitude of the opposition, represented mainly by Viktor Yanukovych’s Party
of Regions, toward the EaP is difficult to define, because this party did not comment on
the initiative. In their political pronouncements, its politicians have for a long time given
assurances that the party supports EU membership,221 and that the European orientation
of Ukraine’s foreign policy remains unchanged and is irreversible.222 At the same time,
Yanukovych calls for the maintenance of close ties with Russia, and during the
Russian-Georgian war his party took the Kremlin’s side and called on the Ukrainian
authorities to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia as soon as possible.223 This gives
rise to doubts as to the sincerity of his party’s declarations about European integration.
The most famous Ukrainian experts in European and foreign policy pronounced
themselves on the EaP positively, if in a restrained manner at times. According to
Oleksandr Sushko, director for scientific affairs of the Institute of Euro-Atlantic
Cooperation, the EaP is an initiative deserving a positive appraisal because for the first
time it singles out Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus from neighbouring countries
which have no chance for integration with the EU, because it announces the signing of
association agreements and the intention to annul visas in the long term. Among the
EaP’s drawbacks, Sushko mentions the fact that it has no institutional structure, in
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218 See Â³öå-ïðåì’ºð-ì³í³ñòð Óêðà¿íè Ãðèãîð³é Íåìèðÿ: “Ñõ³äíå ïàðòíåðñòâî” ñïðèÿòèìå
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219 Commentary by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the European Council Decision
Concerning the Eastern Partnership, 19–20 March 2009, www.mfa.gov.ua.
220 Óêðà¿íà ï³äòðèìóº “Ñõ³äíå ïàðòíåðñòâî” ÿê ³íñòðóìåíò äîñÿãíåííÿ ÷ëåíñòâà â ªÑ—À.
Ãîí÷àðóê, 24.03.2009, www.president.gov.ua.
221 Âûñòóïëåíèå Ëèäåðà Ïàðòèè ðåãèîíîâ Â.Ô. ßíóêîâè÷à íà XI ñúåçäå Ïàðòèè ðåãèîíîâ,
19.04.2008, www.partyofregions.org.ua.
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contrast to the Union for the Mediterranean.224 Iryna Solonenko, director of the
European Program at the International Renaissance Foundation, called for the EU to
offer Eastern partner countries the same reform supporting instruments as are made
available to EU membership candidates, without officially confirming their membership
prospects. She noted, however, that this is not very likely.225 In turn Valeriy Chalyi,
director of the International Program at the Razumkov Centre, said that the EaP initiative
is “not bad,” but does not satisfy any of the parties. He stated, without giving any
supporting arguments, that one of its aims is to “strengthen the position of Poland within
the EU.”226 He also called for the wholesale annulment of visas for Ukrainians within the
framework of the EaP.227 Finally, Vitaliy Martynyuk from the Ukrainian Centre for
Independent Political Research indicated that the EaP creates new possibilities for
strengthening cooperation with the EU, and Ukraine can reinforce its position as
a regional leader. At the same time, he pointed to the EaP’s financing weakness and
disproportions between funds allocated for the Mediterranean region and for the
Eastern European and Caucasian one.228
The four above mentioned experts and other Ukrainian analysts took part in the
formulation of a common proposal with regard to the EaP published in October 2008.229
It comes down to the demand that the EaP provide the same level of assistance the EU
had provided to the countries of Central Europe prior to 2004, including the same level
of financing and privileges, i.e. that it be a form of pre-accession aid without stating this
openly. A considerable portion of the Ukrainian experts’ proposals (such as accession
agreements, the free trade area and increased inter-personal contacts) were later to be
found in the European Commission’s communiqué of December 2008. (£A)
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The launch of “Eastern Partnership” between the European Union and its
Eastern neighbours in Prague, under the Czech presidency of the EU, is by no
means a symbolic event. The fall of communism in Central Europe gave the world
a new hope for peace, security and sovereign right of each country to choose its
own path of development. Today the enlarged European Union, integrating
nations from both sides of the former Iron Curtain, can give Eastern Europe the
same hope.
Eastern Europe is suffering most painfully from the consequences of the
economic crisis, and the region needs a consolidation of its ties with the EU. Hence
the economic crisis must not be an excuse for inaction on the part of the EU; on the
contrary, it makes it even more pressing for the EU to engage in Eastern Europe
financially, offering significant aid for the economies in trouble, as well as politically,
by showing solidarity with the Europeans living outside its exclusive club. EU
assistance today will be much less costly than the consequences of the fall of even
one of these countries, a fall that would hit Europe with tremendous force.
The people of Eastern Europe should be offered a prospect of inclusion in
the broader European family, including the ability to travel and trade freely. The
pursuit of Eastern Partnership would enable the European Union to demonstrate
its strength and reliability, confirming to the world that economic upheavals will
not prevent it from promoting its values and shaping the world in accordance
therewith, at least in its immediate neighbourhood.
The future of Eastern Partnership will be conditional upon the commitment
and political will not only of the countries to which the project is addressed, but
also of the EU member states. Consequently, this report offers a comprehensive
analysis of these countries' standpoints on Eastern Partnership. The conclusions
and proposals concerning the implementation of the initiative included in the
report encourage further thought on the activities that need to be undertaken by
both EU members and EaP addressees in order to make the most of Eastern
Partnership.
Sławomir Dębski, Ph.D.—Director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs
